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REVIEW SECTION SYMPOSIUM
The Wisconsin Influence on Sociolegal Scholarship
Clearing the Underbrush for
Real-Life Contracting
STEWART MACAULAY, JOHN KIDWELL, WILLIAM WHITFORD, AND MARK
GALANTER, Contracts: Law in Action. Vols. 1 and 2. Charlottesville,
Va.: Michie, 1995. Vol. 1: pp. 853, $31. Vol. 2: pp. 787, $31.
William J. Woodward, Jr.
In his famous book, The Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore dubbed
Stewart Macaulay the "Lord High Executioner of the Contract is Dead
school" (Gilmore 1974, 3, n.1; Braucher 1995, 52). Gilmore's book por-
trayed the development and asserted disintegration of classical contract doc-
trine as an epic battle between contract titans, with Samuel Williston
advancing the classical, relatively "objectivist" approach and Arthur Corbin
retorting with something far more nuanced, fact-sensitive, and "real." Gil-
more declared "dead" the objectivist approach and, with it, the distinctive
character of contract law that made it different from the law of torts from
which it emerged in the nineteenth century. Macaulay won his dubious
cameo role' in Gilmore's little drama because his path-breaking research
had examined how contract law actually operated and his findings had
prompted hard questions about the flimsy connection between that "law"
and the "law" that lawyers and law students learn about when they study in
law school.
William J. Woodward, Jr. is I. Herman Stem Professor of Law, Temple University. The
author thanks Amy Boss, Jean Braucher, Jay Feinman, Nathalie Martin, Tom Russell, Frank
Snyder, and Candace Zierdt for their comments on earlier drafts; Lawrence Pockets for
research assistance; and Temple University School of Law for generous research support.
1. Other than a brief mention in Gilmore's first endnote, Macaulay played no part in
Gilmore's rendition of the rise and fall of classical contract. That endnote referred to a 1967
symposium on the relevance of contract theory, which Gilmore gave as evidence for his own
assertion that contract was "dead."
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If Macaulay was Gilmore's metaphorical executioner, he was, in retro-
spect, just beginning to pile firewood around the stake at the time Gilmore
wrote. With the help of his University of Wisconsin colleagues John
Kidwell, William Whitford, and Marc Galanter, Macaulay finally put torch
to tinder with the 1994 publication of Contracts: Law in Action (CLA). 2
This new book for teaching the first-year law school course in contracts
relentlessly develops an understanding of the law as delivered-the "law in
action." 3 It then juxtaposes that evidence with traditional staples of more
traditional contracts courses,4 and thereby exposes the chasm between con-
tract law and real-life business and personal relationships. By focusing on
contract law in action, this effort offers a real-life context for Gilmore's ideas
of contract law' that is unique in this genre. It is in this real world that
lawyers operate; the complex combination of law, business, leverage, com-
mon sense, and ideology is what can give law practice its challenge and
interest. Students sense the distance between law as usually taught and the
law in action; they show this by their incessant craving for tales from the
real world. The irony is that the executioners' iconoclastic efforts breathe
real life into a subject many law students start out believing is "dead."
Being a "casebook," this is not the sort of book one can pick up in a
bookstore and devour in a weekend, and not the kind of book that would
ordinarily serve as the basis for a review essay. 6 But the book will be widely
used in law schools, and it has the power to transform the way students
understand and conceptualize the subject. Moreover, the book assembles in
one place a most remarkable and unique collection of cases, commentary,
and empirical studies about the human phenomenon of making, performing,
and breaking agreements. Thus, despite its casebook form, the book's impor-
tance cannot be overstated.
2. CLA comes in two volumes as well as an abridged one-volume version. References
here are to the two-volume version.
3. More accurately, it develops an understanding of what we know of the law as deliv-
ered. Students who use this book will develop a strong sense of how much we don't know
about the law in action. A strength of the book is its capacity to stimulate further empirical
research into the law in action and thereby carry forward through a new generation the work
begun by Macaulay several decades ago.
4. The book has a large number of "chestnuts," famous contracts cases that serve as
important common ground for all American lawyers. While the use of these cases serves an
important orientation to the language and folklore of contracts, they work very differently in
the classroom when located, as they usually are in CLA, within a broader legal, business, or
social context.
5. While Gilmore referred to Macaulay as a person putting contract law to death, the
"death" Gilmore described in his book was much different from that which we might attribute
to Macaulay. Gilmore declared the "death" of classical, objectivist contract law as developed
by Holmes and Williston and its replacement with neoclassical contract law containing sub-
stantial efforts to locate real, subjective party intent. Macaulay's work, on the other hand, has
showcased the limitations of both classical and neoclassical contract law in the real world of
modern personal and business relationships.
6. Jean Braucher (1995) reviewed volume 1 in a symposium on Death of Contract. A brief
review of volume 2 as a basis for an upper-class contracts course is Woodward 1997a.
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The book arrives at an opportune time for many reasons. The 1980s
and 1990s have witnessed increasing pressure on law schools to teach their
students "how to be lawyers." Critics have condemned the increasingly the-
oretical bent of many legal scholars and their inability or i ui-nneso
teach their students about the "real world" (Edwards 1992). That real world
is at the center of these materials. Readers learn from the raw materials how
appellate opinions emerge from the briefs and records that precede them.7
They learn from literature how hardball negotiation is conducted. They
learn from raw materials about statutory intervention in franchise and em-
ployment contracts. They learn from empirical studies what lawyers actually
put in contracts, why they do it, and whether it really matters. Law students
surely emerge from their studies with a more sophisticated grasp of how a
lawyer can actually use the law and how the law will matter to clients.
The timing is nearly optimal from a theoretical perspective as well.
The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed perhaps an unprecedented growth of
legal, political, and economic analysis based on a "contract" or "con-
tractarian" model, which in turn, is built on an individualist (Braucher
1990), largely objectivist model. In case law, the Supreme Court blithely
concludes that consumers freely "choose," by vendor-supplied form con-
tracts, that a far-distant forum must hear their complaints about the vendor
(Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute [1991]). In politics, the position is seri-
ously advanced that people actually choose the life of inadequate housing,
education, and opportunity that accompanies their welfare checks. In schol-
arship, a professor deploys economic analysis to assert that businesses should
be able to "choose" their law by contract and thereby transport themselves
to a different (and presumably less regulatory) legal regime without leaving
the conference room (Ribstein 1993). And in law reform, several commit-
tees charged with redrafting the Uniform Commercial Code are marching
to the beat of a largely hypothesized "party autonomy."
Because it is a casebook designed to provoke thought and debate
among law students, CLA is relatively open-ended and lacks an explicit
thesis in a conventional sense. Instead, the book advances a different way of
approaching the subject, placing the conventional meat of a "standard" con-
tracts offering into a complex setting of empirical and nonappellate case
material. In its structure and in the selection of materials, the book raises
deep and disturbing questions about the institution both lawyers and
nonlawyers know as "contract law." The book offers us an extraordinary
sketch of contracting and its relationship to contract law in the late twenti-
eth century. It also offers an opportunity to consider more generally the
7. In addition to excerpts from briefs and records of famous contracts cases, the book
includes reports of both published and unpublished studies of business practice, lawyers' nego-
tiations, and judges' behavior. No other published collection of noncase readings on the sub-
ject compares with it.
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unresolved-and perhaps unresolvable-tensions at the core of this pro-
foundly interesting subject.
My focus will be in two primary areas where the book makes its sharp-
est breaks from tradition. The first will be on the implications of placing
traditional contract appellate cases within a wide range of nonlegal materi-
als about the process and context of contracting. Contract law means little
to practicing lawyers when distanced from the world in which it actually
operates, and evidence of authors' dogged pursuit of the law as it actually
operates is pervasive in the book. The broad scope of the readings affect, at
a very basic level, the way one understands the substance of this traditional
law school offering.
The second area of focus is connected to the first. Once we expand our
understanding of how contracting takes place, we confront the complexity
of all but the simplest contractual relations. Yet traditional contract law
comes at this complexity with what amounts to a stick-man model of a
horse-trade between strangers.8 This rift between the simple paradigm and
complex reality has bred a cottage industry of scholars, starting with the
pioneering work of Ian Macneil, who explore the "relational contract," ar-
guably every contract even a little more complex than the horse trade.
These casebook authors built directly on the work of Macneil (1977) by
locating early in the materials a very substantial chapter on contract in the
context of continuing relations. The early development of this competing-
and in many ways contradictory-paradigm for contracting has implications
both at the theoretical and pedagogical levels and raises important ques-.
tions about the entire structure of contract law.
Part 1 will consider some of the implications of the very broad range of
materials this book includes in its study of contracts. Part 2 will then reflect
on the relational ideas introduced through these materials and their impli-
cations for contract theory. Part 3 will conclude with some observations of
recent developments that may open the way for a rethinking of contract
theory so provocatively suggested by CLA.
8. Macneil's 1977 casebook describes the horse trade: "[Alt noon two strangers come
into town from opposite directions, one walking and one riding a horse. The walker offers to
buy the horse, and after brief dickering a deal is struck in which delivery of the horse is to be
made at sundown upon the handing over of $10. The two strangers expect to have nothing to
do with each other between now and sundown; they expect never to see each other thereaf-
ter; and each has as much feeling for the other as has a Viking trading with a Saxon" (1977,
13). Karl Llewellyn used the "horse trade" to illustrate the distance between theory and actual
business practice in a series of articles about sales law in the 1930s and '40s. See, for example,
Llewellyn 1939 a, b.
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I. THE CONTRACTS CASEBOOK "IN ACTION"
Since the time of casebook inventor Christopher Columbus Langdell,
the "case method" has dominated law school instruction. The earliest
CaSCOOKS We e simply a collection of appellate court case opinions with
almost nothing in between. While modem casebooks have added questions,
problems, statutory provisions, excerpts from law reviews, and text written
by the editors, appellate court cases continue to dominate the classroom
materials. From a reader's perspective, the strong implicit suggestion is that
"the law" resides in the pronouncements of appellate court judges and per-
haps in a few statutes. Moreover, traditional materials also suggest that busi-
ness people behave in the way these appellate cases describe. Modem
casebooks too seldom prompt law students or their teachers to consider just
how far appellate pronouncements might deviate from real business practice
and the "law" that arrives at street level.
CLA is a book that redefines the casebook medium. Appellate court
cases are not nearly as dominant, and when they do appear, we find them
with excerpts from the parties' briefs, negotiation history, later develop-
ments, or other contextual material. At appropriate places, readers encoun-
ter large doses of relevant empirical work to further set the context for the
issue in question. Elsewhere they discover substantial excerpts from com-
mentators with views ranging from Roberto Unger (e.g., 1 CLA, p. 619) and
Robert Gordon (e.g., 1 CLA, p. 623) to Richard Posner (e.g., 1 CLA, pp.
95, 613) and Richard Epstein (e.g., 2 CLA, p.1 75). The authors introduce
through their own text entire areas (such as offer, acceptance, and consider-
ation) that usually dominate weeks of a traditional contracts course. Appel-
late cases (many of which are found in other casebooks) surrounded with
these other materials take on an entirely different feel than they would in a
more traditional presentation. 9
Few readers exposed to these materials would conclude that appellate
cases are the important texts for study. But more than that, they come away
from the book with a very different idea than their more traditionalist peers
of what contract law is about and what matters about it. Good examples
abound of both the power of this pervasive nonappellate case material, and
the difference the broader setting makes. A sampling from the materials on
remedies for breach of contract and on social control of the contracting
process will give some idea of the transformative potential of the new
material.
9. There may be a downside to including so much material from disparate sources. The
books, particularly the one-volume version, suffer from editing errors that eventually become
distracting both to teacher and student. These should be corrected in subsequent editions but,
until newer editions are available, the authors might consider preparing errata sheets for the
different forms of this work.
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A. Contract Remedies "in Action"
1. Epistemology
In their general introduction to the materials, the authors state that a
"major theme of the course is that things are not as they may seem" (1
CLA, p. 31). This "epistemological" theme resonates throughout the mater-
ials. Throughout the book, the authors' dominant method is to develop the
"rule" through an appellate case and surround that case with materials that
suggest the myriad difficulties that lie just beneath the rule's surface. The
appellate case looks very different when seen in a broadened context. This
has pedagogical implications: student consumers of these materials develop
a more sophisticated understanding of the kinds of problems they will con-
front as lawyers. The method also has theoretical implications: by sharpen-
ing one's understanding of the divide between the "law on the books" and
the "law in action," the method provokes questions about whether the un-
derlying theory is satisfying, in need of revision, or in need of wholesale
reconceptualization. At a different level, the surrounding readings prompt
us to question our assumptions about the law's workings and to ask ourselves
what we really know about the law and how we know it. Some examples
make this evident.
As any practitioner knows, a great gulf lies between traditional, classi-
cal contract theory and the nitty-gritty of contract practice. In the area of
contract remedies, this manifests itself in the hidden complexity of what
seems a very simple set of rules. As a basic policy matter, the law declares
that one should be made as "well off' with contract damages as one would
have been with full performance (e.g., Uniform Commercial Code [UCCI
§ 1106).10 Beneath the surface of this simple statement is (for newcomers to
contract law) unbelievable complexity. The authors set out right at the start
to show the reader what is potentially involved in trying to implement such
a policy.
In the first case, Shirley Maclaine Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corporation, we are presented with the simple question "What is an
equivalent to the promised performance?" (1 CLA, p. 51). Twentieth Cen-
tury-Fox contracted to pay film star Shirley Maclaine a hefty sum to star in
its musical motion picture, Bloomer Girl. The studio decided not to make
that movie and offered Maclaine instead a starring role in a Western, Big
Country, Big Man, for the same money. Maclaine declined the second
movie and sued for the money she had not been paid for the first. An exten-
10. The Uniform Commercial Code, or UCC, is a statute developed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law
Institute (ALl) for eventual promulgation to the state legislatures. It covers many areas of
commercial law in separate articles and is the predominant source of commercial law in the
United States.
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sion of the principle that the victim of a breach is entitled to the equivalent
of full performance is the proposition that one is entitled to nothing if,
following the breach, one has been offered or given the equivalent of the
promised performance. The studio's defense therefore was that Maclaine
Ghould ' Lave i-aitigatvd her toss by taking the second movie and, as a result,
had no damages. Citing differences in the projects as well as the underlying
contracts, the Supreme Court of California concluded that the movies were
not equivalent and rejected the defense.
Parker is a staple of a traditional contracts course and casebook editors
usually present it to demonstrate the mitigation principle in the context of
an employment contract. People shouldn't sit idle if there is "equivalent"
employment available, and the mitigation principle is thought to encourage
them to seek out (or at least not reject) alternatives. The hard problems lie
just below the surface. Why would anyone reject a 14-week job that paid
$750,000? How is an appellate court (or anyone for that matter) to judge
whether Big Country, Big Man was the "equivalent" of Bloomer Girl? The
authors give us nonappellate court materials with which to consider these
issues.
In text following the case, they describe a series of interviews a former
student conducted with Maclaine's agents and lawyers in 1979. Those inter-
views reveal that Maclaine had been willing to settle her case and that part
of her willingness came from a need to maintain good relations with the
studios. We are also told that she was associated with liberal causes and was
involved in the political campaigns of Robert Kennedy and George McGov-
er. Bloomer Girl was a movie about independent women, whereas Big
Country, Big Man was to be a Western, and a Western projects a very differ-
ent female image. Finally, Bloomer Girl was a big-budget movie and Twenti-
eth Century-Fox was at the time pressed financially. The authors state a
recurring, basic question when they ask, "Is the difficulty of deciding ...
issues of comparability reason enough for courts to limit the question to the
economic or financial aspects of a substitute job which an employer asserts
the employee should have accepted?" (1 CLA, p. 65). This material sets up
a tension that should be very close to the core of contract law. One might
ask, as did Richard Danzig in his path-breaking book, The Capability Problem
in Contract Law," whether the difficulty of judging the complex actions of
others "impede[s] and distort[s] efforts to further preferred values through a
legal system"(Danzig 1974; 1 CLA, pp. 1-2).
The contract law question is whether this difficulty in judging de-
mands and justifies the kinds of simple rules that characterize our contract
11. CLA leans heavily on Danzig's book and pervasively develops the questions it raises.
CLA's authors were, in turn, involved in creating the essays that are collected in Danzig's
book: Stewart Macaulay wrote one, and John Kidwell contributed to a second. See Danzig
1974, 3.
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law doctrine, or whether a doctrine that was more complex, better matching
real-world complexity, would give us better decisions at acceptable cost.12
The non-case law material makes possible an inquiry into these far deeper
questions.
By adding empirical material, another remedies staple of the contracts
course, Anthony Neri v. Retail Marine Corporation (1 CLA, p. 67) becomes
an opportunity to confront a similar rift between contemporary contract
theory and the law "in action." If a retail buyer breaches a sales contract
with a seller and the seller resells the goods for the same retail price as that
in the breached contract, has the seller suffered any loss? A first approxima-
tion would be no: the second sale averted the loss from the first, so the seller
is even. If Shirley Maclaine had agreed to the second movie and been paid
her salary, she would have suffered no loss. 13 But the UCC makes special
provision for the "lost volume seller" in recognition of the fact that, in the
retailing situation, a lost sale is not made up for by a subsequent sale that
the seller would have made anyway.
Neri raises this "lost profits puzzle," a problem that has garnered great
scholarly debate in the past 20 years. 14 Once again, what lies behind this
case is at least as interesting as the theoretical points it raises. We learn, for
example, that the parties' lawyers had scarcely thought about the lost profits
issue when they tried the case, and the buyer's lawyer probably had no op-
portunity to mount a factual challenge to the appellate court's assumption
that the seller qualified as a lost-volume seller. As any practitioner (and
many a client) knows, the litigation system "in action" deviates from its
theoretical model of two equally strong advocates whose battle generates
truth. The real system, of course, includes incompetent counsel and courts
that reach for issues not adequately presented to them. Whatever one makes
of the law's supposed orderliness and logic after this revelation, it is unrav-
eled further by the authors' report of a small empirical study of 16 new car
dealers suggesting that sellers' business concerns make the lost profits prob-
lem all but irrelevant. They quote one dealer: "Realistically, how long could
a dealer who sues customers for lost profits last in a competitive market?
Once the word got out, such a reputation would drive customers away" (1
CLA, p. 78).
12. Neither answer is dominant in the materials. A critical legal studies scholar, Jay
Feinman, is critical of judicial capacity to use complex, multidimensional rules: "First, the
courts are so distant from the actual contexts of cases that judicial application of the method
is properly characterized as interpretive rather than empirical. Second, the courts' interpretive
activity is not and cannot be consistently executed. Third, judicial interpretation is necessar-
ily based on a subjective application of policies more complex than any simple preference for
facilitation of commercial exchange" (1 CLA, p. 416 quoting Feinman 1984, 703).
13. This is surely a "rough" approximation in the Maclaine case. While, by hypothesis,
she would have had the same income from the substitute movie and therefore would suffer no
direct pecuniary loss, in the longer run, the substitute could have resulted in long-term reputa-
tional loss. This latter kind of loss would likely be unprovable in a legal proceeding.
14. An early economic analysis is Goetz and Scott 1979.
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The Neri case is one of the first concrete examples of this epistemologi-
cal theme in the book. If we read the case without the surrounding materi-
als, we might naturally assume it was the product of a litigation system
functioning as designed. The case's value as precedent, one might argue,
depends on those assumptions. If those assumptions are not valid (as so
often they are not), what is the case and how valuable is it? When the
authors present Security Stove & Manufacturing Co. v. American Railways
Express Co. (1 CLA, p. 141), a case that appears in numerous contracts
casebooks, they supplement it with the observation that this 1932 case from
the Kansas City Court of Appeals has been cited by a court only nine times
since (1 CLA, p. 150). What sort of law does this case represent?
Another example of the authors' tendency to press this theme is their
development of another major case, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Co. This 5-
4 Oklahoma decision rejected, as essentially too costly, contract damages
measured by the actual costs (some $29,000) of performing the coal com-
pany's bargained-for promise to fill in the pit created on the plaintiffs' farm
by the company's strip mining (1 CLA, p. 198). Instead, the court awarded
the homeowners $300, the difference in the value of the apparently barren
farmland with and without the hole. Through added material, we learn,
among other things, that members of the court switched votes, that the
plaintiffs' lawyer was a sole practitioner and made some bad legal decisions,
and that two members of the court majority who decided against the
Peevyhouses were accused of taking bribes in other cases and left the bench.
The implicit question recurs: what sorts of principles can we build on the
backs of cases such as this?
Through their selection and placement of the materials, the authors
frontally challenge the pedagogical notion (originally brought to us by
Langdell) that students can acquire what they need to know about contracts
by reading appellate court opinions. For the theorist (or the student who
will become one), the materials do much the same thing by emphasizing the
constructed reality that appellate cases represent. If we are to learn about
contracts and, in particular, if we are to formulate sound policy about con-
tacting, we need to study far more than appellate cases to do so. Several
developments suggest that the need for an expanded approach to legal
scholarship in this field may be more pressing now than ever.
Whatever guidance appellate cases once gave in developing or formu-
lating contract policy, that guidance is much diminished now. Gilmore
pointed out the obvious-that appellate decisions were being eclipsed by
statutes as the primary source of law governing contracts (1974, 68-69). In
the UCC revision process, main objects of a revision are to "simplify, clarify
and modernize the law" and "permit the continued expansion of commer-
cial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties" (UCC
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§ 1-102).15 But where do drafting committees who attempt to improve these
areas of contract law look for guidance in formulating modem policy? While
the old UCC itself can, through dysfunction, point to areas requiring
change, it cannot prescribe the changes needed. The anecdotal experiences
of business lawyers may be myopic, unrepresentative, or consciously 16 or un-
consciously biased. And common law cases, often a source of contract policy
for later codification, are much less reliable for policy guidance now than
before.
Common law cases, always ill-equipped to keep pace with developing
commercial practices, may simply not be plentiful enough for our rapidly
changing culture. Besides the' exponential'expansion of the criminal docket,
an expansive reading of the Federal Arbitration Act has made an unre-
ported arbitrator's decision a far more likely conclusion to a civil dispute
than it was in Gilmore's day. Indeed, there is evidence that arbitration pro-
visions in preprinted adhesion contracts are becoming commonplace and
enforceable.' 7 If the trend continues, 18 the obvious result will be an even
smaller number of reported decisions from which to glean a policy direc-
tion. 19 Less obviously, an expansion of arbitration through form contract for
customers of businesses could result in a substantial weakening of the pro-
15. See also note 10, supra.
16. Paid lobbyists now regularly participate in the UCC revision process. If this is not a
new development, its existence in the past was a little-known secret. In one iconoclastic
article, Schwartz and Scott set out to prove false the assumption "that politics do not influ-
ence the ALl and NCCUSL" the private groups that sponsor the UCC revision process
(Schwartz and Scott 1995).
17. Cases are collected in David Schwartz 1997. Cases in which employers have at-
tempted to enforce arbitration clauses in the employment area are now common in advance
sheets. See, e.g., Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp. (1997)(unenforceable); O'Neil v.
Hilton Head Hosp. (1997)(enforceable). Speidel 1996 addresses adhesion contracts to arbitrate
in the securities industry.
18. One bit of evidence suggests that the trend toward private arbitration via adhesion
contract may have reached its zenith. On August 7, 19'97, the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers voted to eliminate mandatory arbitration (appropriately named) of discrimination
claims made by its registered brokers. Currently, "agreement" to arbitration of all such claims
is a condition of employment in that industry, its imposition coming in the guise of a contract
the brokers are required to sign in order to work. The practice of requiring arbitration of
discrimination claims has been opposed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
See U.S. Law Week 2105-6 (1997).
Whether opposition to "mandatory arbitration by contract" will outpace businesses' em-
brace of arbitration by form contract in other areas is anybody's guess. One business lawyer
recently touted arbitration as the solution to the "class action problem" for banks. Because
there are no class actions in arbitration, a business can reduce the threat of customer class
actions by including arbitration clauses in agreements with customers. For this reason (and no
doubt because there will be little threat of customers "taking their business elsewhere"), the
lawyer opined that all banks would have arbitration clauses in their customer agreements
within five years.
19. Compare Galanter and Cahill 1994, 1385, addressing the analogous phenomenon of
unreported (and confidential) case settlements.
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tection the law offers customers who fall victim to occasional egregious or
predatory business conduct.20
But even the group of remaining judicial decisions might well be sus-
pect. Widespread use of arbitration clauses in form contracts opens the way
for businesses to litigate selectively their "good" cases to a judicial decision
while leaving their "bad" decisions to an unreported arbitration award.2"
Business's ability to selectively litigate, while not new (it was detailed at
length in Galanter 1974), is increased substantially both by the potential
ability to arbitrate disputes selectively and by enhanced power to gather and
share information.22
If the gathering and synthesis of appellate decisions becomes an unreli-
able source of policy wisdom about contracting or commercial practice, and
we eliminate lawyer anecdote, industry assertion, and plain ideology as my-
opic or biased in policy setting, empirical research of the kind the authors
present holds the best prospect for a deepening understanding of con-
tracting and the needs of participants in various contracting contexts. The
rift between case law and the studies CLA juxtaposes with the cases leave
20. Arbitrators are reasonably well paid by the parties to the arbitration process and
contractual arbitration usually permits either party to reject arbitrators they find unaccept-
able. This means that arbitrators will be strongly motivated not to render decisions that will
result in their being regularly stricken by future parties to contractual arbitration. Particularly
if "repeat players" in arbitration share information about the decisions of particular arbitrators,
the arbitrators' financial incentive of obtaining "repeat business" makes them far less "in-
dependent" than even elected judges. One would therefore be hard-pressed to imagine an
arbitrator (who wanted to continue working as an arbitrator) rendering an award against a
"repeat player" that included substantial punitive damages or other penalties. To the extent
the law permits extreme damages or penalties for extreme conduct, we would expect arbitra-
tors to be less likely (perhaps far less likely) to award them than would relatively independent
judges or juries.
In Gordon Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) (1 CLA, p. 471), the California
Supreme Court permitted the plaintiffs complaint seeking compensatory and punitive dam-
ages in tort for wrongful discharge to proceed for reasons of public policy. One would be hard-
pressed to imagine an arbitrator (again, interested in being an arbitrator in the future) arriving
at the same conclusion.
21. Some cases suggest that arbitration provisions that are enforceable by one party but
not the other may come under enhanced judicial scrutiny. In O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp.
(1997), the court upheld an employee's agreement to arbitrate Family and Medical Leave Act
claims. Citing Hull v. Norcom, Inc. (1985, 1549), however, the court suggested that the result
might be different if the provision permitted the employer to ignore the results of arbitration.
22. In the context of private settlement, Galanter and Cahill (1994, 1385-86) suggest
that repeat players' ability to gather and analyze private settlement information will give them
further strategic advantages in disputes with one-shotters. Perhaps related to the further ac-
cumulation of advantage by repeat players is a trend identified by Ralph James Mooney
(1995) in the cases of several Western jurisdictions that show a resurgence of a primitive,
Willistonian approach to contract and related issues. The decisions he details tend to favor
the contract drafter, the employer, or the business partner with the power to dictate terms.
The accumulated wisdom of courts and scholars about contracting from the 1930s onward is
neither confronted in the new decisions nor anywhere in evidence. Do these cases reflect a
newly enlightened thinking about contract law or systematic "law reform" efforts on the part
of American business?
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both teacher and student with no doubt that there is much more work to be
done.
2. The Costs of Law
Perhaps the greatest deviation between contract remedies on the books
and "in action" is also the most basic. Contract law's fundamental remedial
policy objective is to make the injured party as well off with damages as she
would have been with full performance. This is embodied in UCC §1-106,
which solemnly declares that the "remedies provided by this Act shall be
liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as
good a position as if the other party had fully performed." But every lawyer
knows that contract damages are a far distant second to full performance.
They also know that, in smaller transactions, the cost of getting the remedy
will exceed recoverable damages. As an instructional matter, any new law-
yer who doesn't know these basic facts will be in for a big surprise the first
time she encounters a contract problem in her law practice. For the theorist,
the question is whether these basic facts are, more or less, beside the point
or whether the costs of law must be taken account of when thinking about
contract remedies theory itself. Most contracts casebooks and many con-
tracts theorists proceed as if these damages policy goals are in fact being
met, when of course, they are not.23 CLA places this question near the
center of its coverage of contract remedies.
The tendency among some theorists to assume that contract remedies
deliver a full money equivalent of the lost performance is most evident in
the notion of "efficient breach." The idea here is that because contract rem-
edies deliver a full measure of money damages to the injured party, the
breacher ought to breach the contract if a breach will result in enough profit
to pay the contract measure of damages and have profit left over.2 4 No one,
the story goes, will be worse off, and someone (the breacher) will be better
23. Contract law requires "foreseeability" of consequential damages and requires that
damages be proved with reasonable certainty. Both limit the plaintiffs ability to show where
she would have been but for the breach. But more than that, contract cases are inevitably
complex-each conversation about performance or payment has potential relevance to both
liability and damages. This makes litigation of contracts cases more complex than negligence
cases of comparable size and may account for the fact that few plaintiffs' lawyers will take
contract cases on a contingency-fee basis. Once we take account of the plaintiffs expenses in
bringing even the simplest contracts case, it becomes very difficult to believe that the goals of
the contracts remedies system are being met except, perhaps, in extremely large cases where
the damages dwarf the costs of getting them.
24. One reader said this sentence was too strong and that the theory merely permits the
breacher to breach the contract but is neutral on whether she should. The theory of efficient
breach seems stronger than that. If some action will cause the general economic welfare to
increase, this theory would call for us to encourage it, not merely tolerate it. The prospect of
making a "profit" from the breach gives the economically motivated breacher the incentive
the theory requires.
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off. This "theory" can support the present system's preference for money
damages over compelled performance (Posner 1992, 117-19), uphold the
present system's refusal to enforce penalty clauses, 25 and condemn the tort
of interference with contract (Perlman 1982).
Of course, like much else in this field, the theory of efficient breach is
just too simple to be true. The legal system has considerable slippage in
assessing damages and rejects some kinds of damages entirely, partly because
of difficulties in judging made so clear in the book's materials on the Parker
case. Slippage inevitably operates against the party with the burden of proof,
usually the victim of the breach. But more important than the difference
between the law's aspiration and its actual delivery of contract damages,
"law is not free" (1 CLA, p. 35). The claimant usually has to pay a lawyer to
get the damages and that payment comes out of whatever damages, the law
ultimately awards. CLA introduces students to this basic fact of contracts
practice very early with an excerpt from Mark Galanter's Why the Haves
Come Out Ahead (1974; 1 CLA, p. 11), and the authors develop and
strengthen this observation throughout the book.
The authors also present their readers directly with a corollary: the
party holding the money (i.e., usually the defendant) has inevitable advan-
tage or leverage. This version of the grade-school adage "possession is nine-
tenths of the law" is given great initial force through an excerpt from Class
Struggle Is the Name of the Game, a book that describes the experiences of a
political science professor who invented a board game, contracted for its
manufacture, and when it didn't sell as expected, couldn't pay for it (1
CLA, p. 160). The reading describes a meeting where the inventors found a
small defect in the 50,000 already-manufactured game boards for which they
owed $95,000. Instead of throwing in the towel, the buyers parlayed the tiny
defects into leverage for a settlement, which turned out to be, by far, the
cheapest way out for the manufacturer (1 CLA, p. 161).
CLA teaches, as fundamental, baseline facts, that contract remedies
don't deliver what they promise, and that the leverage of the status quo is
important. It shows throughout that the influence of money and power,
through the cost and quality of lawyers and the leverage of simple size, has a
tremendous influence over what one winds up with following a breach of
contract. If the case is a "small case," the costs of litigation will foreclose it
unless, of course, the claimant is big and can afford an occasional small case
to teach a lesson or establish a precedent. What might be the implications
for contract theory?
Many have suggested that if the system is serious about making the
nonbreacher as well off as performance would have, expanded specific per-
25. Judge Richard Posner, an early advocate of efficient breach theory, advances, then
rejects, the efficient breach argument in Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co. (1985; 1 CLA,
p. 98).
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formance may be the solution.26 This has long been the rule in civil law
systems, and their economic systems function perfectly well with it in place.
Related to enforcement by specific performance in civil law countries is
their general validation of penalty clauses, subject to judicial revision in
extreme cases.2 7 In fairly negotiated contracts,2 8 an expansion of penalty-
clause enforcement might get us closer to the ideal of replicating through
damages the breacher's full performance. 29 To redress the "small case" prob-
lem, an expansion of attorney fee shifting might be in order, at least in
those cases where it would not chill access of citizens to courts. 30
Once students recognize the high cost of law, they also recognize the
more general point that one's rights depend in no small measure on one's
ability to get enforcement. That ability is directly linked to one's access to
legal services, which in turn, has a very high correlation to wealth. "Equal
justice under law" is surely not a descriptive phrase in our culture, given the
costs of law and the correlation between access to lawyers and one's wealth.
Indeed, measured by recent societal trends in reducing our commitment to
delivery of free legal services to those who cannot afford lawyers, the phrase
seems barely aspirational. 31 The empirical materials the authors assemble
make a compelling (but politically unpopular) case for an expansion of af-
fordable legal services for the poor, the near poor, and even the middle
class. They also point to a less politically loaded need to develop cheap,
26. An early example is Linzer '1981.
27. Section 343 of the German Civil Code provides, in part, that "if a penalty due is
disproportionately high, the court may upon the obligor's request reduce it to an appropriate
amount. In determining the question of what is appropriate, every legitimate interest of the
obligee, not only financial interest, has to be considered" (see generally Von Mehren and
Gordley 1977, 819).
28. A broader validation of liquidated damages clauses also exposes those without nego-
tiating power-consumers, small businesses, employees, and others-to further disadvantage
when such clauses begin to show up in adhesion contracts. This is one of many places where
the law should divide adhesion contracts from others and design separate rules for each. The
tendency in the Article 2 redrafting process has been to treat adhesion and fully negotiated
contracts with the same rules and, instead, divide contracts into "consumer" and "noncon-
sumer" contracts.
29. American scholars have advocated broader enforcement of penalty clauses, often on
the theory that the parties know best and that courts should therefore not interfere. Compare
Goetz and Scott 1977. Alan Schwartz (1990) has advanced the idea that they should be
enforced because the fear that one party will gouge the other on the basis of their initial
bargaining positions is unwarranted. The individualist logic of these positions would leave the
policing of liquidated damages clauses to "the market" and foreclose direct civil-law-style judi-
cial supervision.
30. Awarding attorney fees to successful plaintiffs ("one-way fee shifting") is a feature of
much consumer legislation. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. But fee shifting is the exception to the more
general rule that one must pay one's own lawyer, no matter how small the case.
31. The principal federal vehicle for delivery of legal services to the poor, the Legal
Services Corporation (LSC), has been under attack since its creation. In 1996, LSC received
a 25% cut in federal funding, from $400 million to $227 million. Federal legislation also
restricted the ability of entities funded by LSC to deliver a full range of available legal services
to the poor.
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affordable complaint-processing mechanisms to redress the claims that are
too small to pay for themselves.
B. Social Control of Contracting "in Action"
The book's chapter on social control addresses those parts of contract
law that separate modem contract law from the law of the jungle. We don't
enforce contracts to commit crimes. We don't enforce contracts made with
persons of diminished capacity, formed under duress, or based on misrepre-
sentations. More modernly, we don't enforce contracts that we characterize
as "unconscionable." This cluster of issues is an important part of any con-
tracts course because it develops sophistication with the regulatory side of
the contracting process (Braucher 1990). Ours is a system that often es-
pouses "party autonomy" as its ideology. A contract course's material on
social control teaches that party autonomy, when it exists, is not unlimited
and that its existence is often questionable as well. Any set of contracts
teaching materials must address this cluster of problems.
CLA uses the material for the traditional purposes. But the authors also
use this material as a principal vehicle for developing the relationship be-
tween contract law and ideology. Once again, it is the nonappellate case
material that makes this possible.
Neoclassic contract continues to be dominated by a paradigm transac-
tion that scarcely exists. Two well-informed strangers come together, pro-
pose clear, quantifiable terms,. freely agree, and either perform their
obligations or breach. The paradigm is highly individualistic and within the
liberal tradition. The paradigm projects a deal that may be fully understood
(and adjudicated) by third parties and is fully thought out at the beginning.
It projects parties who are essentially selfish, fully able to look after their
own interests, and not responsible in any sense for the welfare of each other.
Pressed further, the paradigm suggests that the deal is nobody's business but
the parties' and that the courts' job is simply to be an umpire: decide what
the parties agreed to and enforce it, if necessary. Under no- circumstances
should a court second-guess the substance of the parties' agreement: people
can look out for themselves and nobody can know what a party's interest is
as well as the party.
Taken to the extreme, this paradigm would exclude judicial oversight
of the contracting process in all but a handful of cases. The law is, of course,
more invasive than that; across the doctrines, the debate is about the appro-
priate degree of social control over the process. While even the staunchest
ideologue mightconcede that' a contract formed at gunpoint ought to be
avoided on account of duress, lesser forms of pressure would yield a robust
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debate about whether the victim ought to have been stronger.32 The book
underscores just how difficult and value laden this debate can be and shows
how contract law mirrors modem politics. How self-reliant can we expect
people to be? Is it appropriate for the law to protect people from consenting
to their own victimization (1 CLA, p. 623, quoting Gordon 1985)? In what
sense are they really "consenting" when they sign a boilerplate contract pre-
pared, tested, and perfected over many years by its drafter?
The debate about whether real choice is involved in making contracts
finds its greatest contemporary expression in form contracts, either when
exchanged by businesses that do business with one another, or when used by
businesses to structure their business relationships with others (such as con-
sumers and small businesses) that don't have their own forms. Since before
the 1930s, we have recognized that the form contract is a different species
of "contract" altogether (Kessler 1943; Llewellyn 1939a), and since then we
have been of two minds about them. 33 Like other mass-produced items, we
like the form contract because it delivers economies of scale and low per-
item expense. Businesses structure their dealings with their form contracts,
and it is difficult to conceive of businesses doing business without them. But
with the form contract comes the absence of negotiation. And because the
drafter is the quintessential "repeat player" with its form (cf. Galanter
1974), there is a substantial disparity in understanding the terms of the deal.
This "asymmetry of information," as economists would call it, makes it im-
possible to fit this kind of contract to the old negotiation-among-equals
paradigm that underlies both the classical contract paradigm and basic eco-
nomic theory. Nonetheless, American law is dogged in attempting to fit the
form contract into the free bargain, individualistic paradigm.
A different approach would be to subject adhesion contracts to direct
social control. A business drafting a nonnegotiable form is creating a "law"
to govern its relationship with someone else. We might, therefore, analogize
form contracts to private legislation by businesses and directly supervise the
private "legislators" (Kessler 1943, 640). Continental legal systems do this
by providing that "surprising terms" found in form contracts do not become
part of the bargain of the parties. 34 This analysis takes the pretense of free
32. With Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co. (1 CLA, p. 613), the authors use an eco-
nomic duress case, together with other materials, to do three things at once. First, they give
readers a modem vision of duress from law and economics guru Judge Richard Posner who
wrote the opinion. Second, they give students a lesson in law and economics by adding mate-
rial about Posner and his approach to problems (1 CLA, p. 616). Finally, by preceding Selmer
with Wisconsin duress decisions, they raise procedure questions. The case was subject to Wis-
consin law, and federal courts were bound to follow it. Yet, in federal court, Posner deploys an
entirely different analysis than would Wisconsin courts to decide it. Can he do that? What is
the "law of Wisconsin" once this federal judge is through with it?
33. The term "adhesion contract" was brought to us by Edwin Patterson (1919) in an
article with the provocative title "The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy."
34. The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Art. 2.20, pro-
vides, in part that no term "contained in standard terms which is of such a character that the
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agreement out of the mix but, in its place, injects direct social control by
courts. It also implies that a measure of social responsibility is expected of
the form-drafting "legislators." This social responsibility is at odds with a
rigorously individualistic model where self interest is all that is important.
In the United States, we have begun to recognize that nondrafters do
not agree to every term in a form that accompanies their dealings with a
business (1 CLA, p. 16). Evidence of our recognition is federal legislation
such as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.
[1998]), which regulates consumer warranties, parts of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (e.g., UCC § 2-316), and judicial decisions. 35 CLA offers us
excerpts from scholars who have advocated simple, direct regulation of the
form contract and the elimination of any pretense that bargain is involved
(Leff 1969 [1 CLA, p. 7681; Macneil 1984 [1 CLA, p. 683]). But this grow-
ing awareness that form contracts are different is by no means universal.
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court decided Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Shute (1991). Given good eyesight and plenty of time, the careful
reader could find, in the eighth of 25 boilerplate paragraphs of the cruise
line's form contract, a provision specifying Florida as the forum for disputes
arising from a cruise the Washington state couple was taking off the West
Coast. After Mrs. Shute suffered personal injury on the cruise and sued the
cruise line in Washington, the trial court granted the cruise line summary
judgment on the basis of the contract's clause. The Shutes' appeal chal-
lenged the constitutionality of depriving them of a convenient forum
through such an adhesion contract. Over Justice Stevens's powerful dissent
challenging the proposition that the Shutes "agreed" to the forum-selection
clause, the majority slid over the "agreement" issue and enforced the forum-
selection clause in the contract. 36 We find similar action in the courts con-
cerning arbitration clauses consumers find (usually after the fact) in their
form contracts. 37 In two bankruptcy cases (Pate v. Melvin Williams Manufac-
other party could not reasonably have expected it, is effective unless it has been expressly
accepted by that party."
35. The judicial fountainhead may have been Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors (1960),
which held that an automobile industry's standard disclaimer of liability for personal injury
damages, buried in boilerplate in a new-car purchase agreement, was unenforceable as against
the public policy of New Jersey. As is typical, CLA's authors add that Mrs. Henningsen's
lawyer made no such argument (1 CLA, p. 678).
36. Contract has superseded older views of jurisdiction in this respect. In Professional Ins.
Corp. v. Sutherland (1997), the Alabama Supreme Court rejected its older approach of invali-
dating forum selection clauses. Its earlier approach had viewed such bargains as violative of
public policy in that the private parties were attempting to confer or limit a court's jurisdic-
tion, which they had no business doing. Following the U.S. Supreme Court, the Alabama
court chose instead to generally uphold them. In the process, that court opined that there is
"recognition that it is neither unfair nor unreasonable under the circumstances to hold the
parties to their bargain to litigate in the chosen forum."
37. In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. (1997), the arbitration clause came after what most
observers would call "the sale." It came after delivery and payment, being located in the
documentation packed in a box containing a computer, cables, instructional manuals, and
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tured Homes, Inc. [1996]; Truckenbrodt v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. [1996]),
for example, the courts upheld arbitration clauses in consumer contracts
despite claims of unconscionability and lack of mutuality. The Supreme
Court has sustained challenges to state legislation purporting to limit the
enforceability of arbitration clauses in consumer form contracts because the
state legislation conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act (Doctor's Associ-
ates v. Casarotto [1996]; Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §2 [1998]; David
Schwartz 1997).38
Using "free agreement" as a reference point clouds the policy choices
in these areas. Perhaps it is sound policy to enforce forum selection or arbi-
tration clauses for reasons other than asserted "real agreement." But if that is
the case, the clauses should come under legislative scrutiny so that fairness
parameters might be set directly. 39 The notion either that self-reliant cus-
tomers will police businesses' predatory conduct by refusing to agree or, put
differently, that "the market" will control predatory conduct, is illusory4°
(but see Schwartz and Wilde 1979, quoted at 1 CLA, p. 695). As if to make
my point, a recent client newsletter from a large law firm trumpeted the
bankruptcy court arbitration cases mentioned above. The short discussion
concluded this way: "If you are interested in adding an arbitration clause to
your consumer loan documentation, please contact [x, Esq.]." Nothing in
the newsletter suggested one iota of risk that consumers might reject an
software ordered by mail. The form documentation purported to change the time the contract
was formed until after delivery, by instructing the customers to pack up and return the new
computer, and all its accompanying paraphernalia, within 30 days if they didn't like the terms.
The trial court had concluded that the "present record is insufficient to support a finding of a
valid arbitration agreement between the parties or that plaintiffs were given adequate notice
of the arbitration clause" (1997, 1148). Nonetheless, in neo-Willistonian style, Chief Judge
Easterbrook looked beyond substance to form and held that by "keeping the computer beyond
30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway's offer, including the arbitration clause" (1997, 1150).
38. An extensive discussion of a reactionary trend in contracts decisions by courts in the
Western states is detailed in Mooney 1995.
39. Uncharacteristically, the Uniform Commercial Code has inched in the direction of
direct regulation in this instance. Section 2A-106 limits choice of law and forum in consumer
leases. The drafting of Article 2B, governing software and other licensing, goes in the opposite
direction by explicitly validating broad choice of law and forum clauses with very narrow
limits even for consumers. See UCC §§ 2B-107, 2B-108, April 1998 draft. See also infra note
81.
40. Businesses have a wealth of empirical data on the effect of small-print, risk-shifting
terms within the boilerplate in their form contracts. It would be foolhardy to draft a form
purporting to control a sale without considering what influence the new form will have on
sales generally. In the same way that the tobacco companies carefully watched their sales
volume as health warnings began to appear on cigarette packs, many businesses no doubt
track the influence of new, risk-shifting terms on their sales. Such information, if revealed,
could begin to settle once and for all the debate between those who believe the market will
control the terms in form contracts and others who believe that claim to be invalid.
The access businesses have to such information suggests, first, that researchers should
attempt to gain access to that information either from the businesses directly or from plaintiffs
who have compelled its production through discovery in litigation or otherwise. Second, until
the empirical information is revealed by those who own it, policymakers should presume, as
an empirical matter, that the market does not control such terms.
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approved loan if they managed to uncover and understand an arbitration
clause within the "loan documentation. ' '41
The basic tension in form contracts comes down to this: how do we
preserve the efficiencies that come with form contrrac. and, At th sn-
time, preserve our underlying theory that contractual obligation ultimately
rests on the actual, free agreement of the contracting parties. This same sort
of tension is manifest when we consider form contracts from a basic eco-
nomic perspective.
Our free market economic theory depends on traders evaluating (pric-
ing) their exchanges as accurately as possible so that, eventually, desired
goods and services will be produced and undesired goods and services will
not be produced. Because contract terms allocate risk, they form part of the
information on which buyers make decisions about what goods or services to
buy. Ideally, then, we want those buyers to fully understand the terms of
their deals so they will arrive at the "correct" pricing and send the "correct"
message about what they value to the ultimate producers. 42 An obscure risk-
shifting contract term can result in a "wrong" buyer assessment of value and,
therefore, in the "wrong" signal being sent to the producers. 43 All of this
argues for an approach to contracting that gives us confidence that those
41. Some recipients of form contracts actually do read and understand even the terms
that would be obscure to most readers. What is to be done with those cases? A classical or
neoclassical contract approach would hold such informed recipients to the obscure provisions
in their form contracts, even if most people would not understand the terms of the form they
were being handed (Meyerson 1993). Such an approach is founded on real agreement-the
form recipient knew what the form drafter intended-and therefore implies a mechanism that
will discriminate between those few who understand and assent to the form and the far larger
number who do not (e.g., Meyerson 1993, 1299). The alternative, suggested by torts scholar
(and now Judge) Robert E. Keeton, is far more regulatory: to deny enforcement across the
board, even for those who actually agreed to the obscure terms (Keeton 1971, 358 6.3[b]).
Apart from inconsistent judicial interpretations of exactly the same form, an agreement-
centered approach in this context implies high costs to separate the knowing recipients from
the unknowing. Those costs have differential impact on the parties to the dispute. Consumers
and small businesses have less capacity than a big business to absorb any given dollar costs of
litigation, and therefore, costly rules affect their rights more than they do those of large busi-
nesses. The mere possibility of the recipient's knowing agreement inserts a question of fact
into all form contract cases and, unlike a more regulatory approach, makes such cases not
easily susceptible to summary judgment.
Preventing the "windfall" that would accrue to the few who actually understand does not,
in my view, justify inflicting the costs of fact-sensitive, individualized adjudication on every-
one. In a different context, Grant Gilmore makes much the same point when describing the
merits of the objective approach to contract, which he describes as arriving about a century
ago (1974, 42).
42. This general analysis is basic to an understanding of conventional economics and is
found early in economics texts. See, e.g., Mansfield and Behravesh (1986).
43. Producers are economically motivated not to showcase risk-shifting terms in their
form contracts. Buyers, for example, should pay less for goods sold with no warranties than
they pay for goods sold with warranties. But if a producer can successfully disclaim warranties
without its buyers noticing it, it can charge more for what it sells than a competitor less adept
at obscuring a disclaimer of warranty. Obviously, from a larger economic perspective, it would
be undesirable to so reward contracting activity that tended to reduce the likely information
in exchanges.
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purchasing through form contracts either purchased with actual knowledge
of the risk implications of the contract terms or actually accepted the risks
that the otherwise unknown terms might present. Obviously, at this level,
the economic analysis nicely tracks the "freedom" analysis at the core of
contract theory.
The situation looks a little different, of course, from the producer's
standpoint. If achievable at all, full buyer understanding of contract terms is
extraordinarily expensive, whether measured at the point of contracting or
at the point where a contract dispute arises. Businesses need to price their
standard goods and services accurately, and the contract risks they take in
selling are important components of their pricing decisions. A business's
economic planning depends on those contract terms being enforced; pro-
ducer planning would be nearly impossible if the contracts through which
products are distributed could easily be revised after the fact. Moreover, the
immediate savings in transaction costs that come with mass-produced form
contracts would be lost if distributors had to worry about a buyer's actual
understanding of terms in discrete transactions.
The basic problem, then, is that both general economic theory and our
liberal traditions of free agreement push us toward a policy of ensuring true,
knowing agreement. Yet business planning and transactional efficiency
press in the opposite direction, toward an approach that does not look too
closely for actual agreement. We want to rely substantially on individual
self-interest (and relatively less on government regulation) to protect
against unscrupulous merchants who slip an obscure disclaimer into the
form so they can charge the same money for less. Yet we want to give busi-
nesses some ascertainable, outward sign, not dependent on real agreement,
that the deal they conclude via their form will hold up. As long as we con-
tinue to analyze these issues as if they are predicated on some version of real
agreement, the irresolvable tension will remain.
There is perhaps no better contemporary example of this tension than
is manifest in the ongoing process of redrafting the Uniform Commercial
Code. 44 This quasi-legislative process involving academics and lawyers ulti-
mately produces final drafts of legislation that are then taken to individual
state legislatures for uniform enactment. 45 In the redrafting of Article 2, the
article governing sales of goods, the tension has shown up in the term "man-
ifest assent," a statutory expression connoting the appearance of agreement
on which a form drafter can rely.
44. The redrafting process is sponsored by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute. Drafts can be found on
the NCCUSL Home Page, http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm. The drafting com-
mittees welcome comments about the drafts or the ongoing process generally.
45. The process has been subjected to considerable criticism. Examples include Schwartz
and Scott 1995 and Scott 1994.
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What will constitute the "manifest[ing] of assent" has been the bone of
contention. Form drafters, of course, want some objective sign of "agree-
ment" on which they can rely that will foreclose later buyer challenges to
the carefully developed terms in the form. Those on the other side of the
debate want a chosen signal that seems likely to reflect actual agreement (or
a conscious acceptance that something bad may lurk in the unread form) in
a reasonable percentage of cases.
The Article 2 drafting committee has ridden a pendulum swinging
from an emphasis on real "agreement" to an emphasis on bureaucratic effi-
ciency. At one point, the draft provided that "a signature or other conduct"
would, absent unconscionability, manifest assent in a nonconsumer con-
tract, apparently without regard to the content or length of the form, the
circumstances of signing, or the recipient's actual knowledge of the form's
content.46 Owing, no doubt, to the recent involvement of "consumer repre-
sentatives" in the redrafting process, 47 consumer contracts were to get dif-
ferent treatment, something resembling the civil law's "surprising terms"
approach.48
In a matter of months, the pendulum swung back in the direction of
real agreement. At that point, the drafters devoted an entire provision to
the question of what would suffice to "manifest assent" (revised UCC § 2-
103, November 1996 draft). The provision told us that one would "manifest
assent" by signing an unread form, but added the important qualifier that
the nondrafter must have had an opportunity to decline to sign before sign-
ing, a small statutory push in the direction of real agreement.
46. The section provided that such a term "becomes part of the contract without regard
to the knowledge or understanding of individual terms by the party assenting to the standard
form record, whether or not the party read the form" (Draft, March 1996).
47. The new arrival of "consumer representatives" in the UCC drafting processes, is a
byproduct of a recent academic outcry over the lack of consumer sensitivity during a recently
completed process of revising Articles of the UCC dealing with banking transactions. See, for
example, Budnitz 1992, King 1992, Cooper 1993, Hillebrand 1994, Miller 1994, Rosmarin
1994. The new presence of consumer representatives has, predictably, blunted some of the
efforts to bureaucratize the form contract area; but (perhaps predictably) the tendency has
been to carve out consumer contracts for special treatment. Of course, consumers are not the
only ones who fall prey to terms hidden in the boilerplate of form contracts. Small businesses,
in particular, are at a serious disadvantage when handed a small-print form loaded with ob-
scure provisions favoring the vendor in a small transaction. Unfortunately, small businesses'
interests are far more diffuse and less organized than are consumers'. Their interests have few
representatives in the UCC redrafting effort, and the tendency thus far is to assume that they
have the same bargaining power, sophistication, and self-reliance when purchasing on others'
forms as the Microsoft's and Bank of America's. In Woodward 1997c, I argue that the pres-
ence of consumer representatives has polarized our thinking about form contracts into con-
sumer/nonconsumer contracts, whereas the reality calls for an analysis and set of rules that
carve up form contracts based on the economic realities of the transaction. One would predict
that the interests of small businesses will suffer in the redrafting process from provisions such
as the parol evidence rule provision described later in the text.
48. Terms that a consumer "could not reasonably have expected" were not included in
the contract, even with a signature, unless "the consumer expressly agrees to the term." Com-
pare the text of the UNIDROIT Principles quoted above in note 34.
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As might have been predicted by the conceptual irreconcilability of
the views, the drafters either gave up or reached impasse. Later drafts have
simply dropped the effort to define what would "manifest assent" in non-
consumer contracts; 49 unless something new is added, it will apparently be
up to the courts to decide case by case under myriad facts, whether a signa-
ture is "some,". "presumptive," or "conclusive" evidence that the recipient
agreed to the boilerplate. 50
The conceptual rift reappears in the redrafting process in connection
with the parol evidence rule, a staple of the law school contracts course and
necessary component to efficient mass-produced contracts.
If a carefully drafted form is to control the relationship, it is critical
that the nondrafter be unable to bring to court statements allegedly made by
the drafter's agents in the course of making the contract. For if the other
party can attempt to prove in court the salesperson's (allegedly) grandiose
statements about the product, the form will cease to control, and (gasp!) the
other party might even succeed in expanding the business's commitment
from what was planned at headquarters to what the salesman/agent may
have committed to in the field. If the law will rule the sales pitch inadmissi-
ble, other methods of controlling a sales force (such as better training or
compensation that is less tightly tied to sales) become less necessary.
American contract law has traditionally limited evidence of discussions
that preceded the moment of contract formation with its parol evidence
rule.51 The rule provides, essentially, that if the parties are in agreement on
the question, a court will enforce their desire to exclude evidence of pre-
contract negotiations and statements, and focus most of its search for mean-
ing on the writing itself. While the rule is a quagmire of exceptions and
49. The 1 March 1998 draft deals solely with "consumer contracts" (Revised UCC § 2-
206, 1 March 1998 draft).
50. The UCC revision process is structurally incapable of resolving strong policy dis-
agreements. Because its final product must be enacted without substantial amendments by all
the states, the drafters eschew anything controversial lest an interest group makes good its
threat to block the legislation in influential states. See generally Janger 1997; Woodward
1997b.
51. The parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds are both critical components in our
contract system, which envisions the parties foreseeing and planning all details of their future
relationship and committing them to writing in unambiguous words accessible to third-party
decision makers. Both emphasize the central importance of the "moment" of contract forma-
tion, before which there was nothing and after which is a fully developed and planned rela-
tionship. In Japan, the approach to contracting comes much'closer to the "relational
contract" that has been making at least theoretical headway in the United States. In Japan,
the moment of contract formation is far less crucial; rather, the idea is to begin a skeletal
relationship of trust that envisions give and take as the relationship matures. Both the statute
of frauds and the parol evidence rule are out of place in that system. See generally Kuzuhara
1996.
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views,52 it no doubt serves a useful purpose in some fully negotiated contract
settings. 53
To make a form contract effective, a drafter will naturally insert in the
form a term stating that the form consists of the parties' entire agreement
and that nothing that preceded the form is operative. Even courts taking a
"liberal view" of the rule54 have pointed to such "merger clauses" '55 as impor-
tant evidence of the parties' intent to exclude evidence of preformation
discussions. 56 The statutory drafting question is another version of the ten-
sion seen earlier: how binding should a boilerplate merger clause be on the
nondrafter?
Through successive drafts of Article 2, the approach for nonconsumers
swung from no mention of the merger clause, 57 to giving a merger clause
52. An excerpt (Calamari and Perillo 1967) that summarizes the complexity and princi-
ple tensions within the rule appears at 2 CLA, p. 292.
53. One place where one does not typically find an intent to exclude what came before
the writing is in collective-bargaining agreements between unions and employers. I learned
from Clyde Summers that such contracts are often recognized by management and labor to be
organic and are meant to change with the changing relationship between labor and manage-
ment. The process of revisiting what was said or done earlier may even serve a therapeutic
purpose as the parties work through conflict by including the past in their discussions. Collec-
tive-bargaining agreements, despite their apparent formality, are in this context an illustration
of "relational contracts," which are not fixed for all time at the outset but which grow and
change with the parties' relationship.
A discussion in which grievance processes under collective-bargaining agreements are
contrasted with the approach to employee disputes in at-will contracts begins at 1 CLA, p.
440.
54. The principal battleground on the parol evidence question is this: how will a court
determine the parties' intent on the question of exclusion of pre-contract evidence-from
testimony about what came before the writing, or from the writing itself? The more modern
approach, espoused by contract law giant Arthur Corbin (1944), puts real agreement in the
ascendancy. A court following that premise would conclude that the complex question of
intent cannot be derived from the face of a document; evidence on the question should be
taken. Justice Roger Traynor took this approach in Masterson v. Sine (1968; 2 CLA, p. 317)
and a series of cases that followed it. The conservative view, long associated with Samuel
Williston, is bureaucratic, "objective," and thought more certain: oral testimony even on that
intent question makes the writing too uncertain in its effect, eviscerates the parol evidence
rule, and ought to be excluded. This was the approach of Mitchell v. Lath (1928; 2 CLA, p.
309).
55. A merger clause is simply a contract term stating the parties' intent that the writing
controls and that prior discussions, commitments, and so on, are superseded (or "merged") in
the writing. In a form contract, the merger clause is simply another boilerplate term. Despite
the fact that its effect can be to abrogate express "warranties" made by the exuberant salesper-
son, there is no current statutory requirement that the merger clause be "conspicuous," in
"plain language," or otherwise understandable.
56. In Justice Roger Traynor's opinion in Masterson v. Sine (1968; 2 CLA, p. 317), he
noted that the contract in question "does not explicitly provide that it contains the complete
agreement" (2 CLA, p. 319).
57. The July 1996 draft of section 2-202 of the UCC contained nothing about merger
clauses. It stated that the core issue of intent to integrate would be determined from all rele-
vant evidence "including evidence of a previous agreement or representation or of a contem-
poraneous oral agreement or representation." The full text read, "In determining whether the
parties intended a writing or record to be final or complete and exclusive with respect to some
or all of the terms, the court shall consider all evidence relevant to intention to integrate the
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"presumptive" validity (i.e., allowing the nondrafter to try to show it did not
reflect true agreement),5 8 to giving it "conclusive" validity.5 9 Perhaps, again,
conceding the irreconcilability of the policy goals, better heads may have
prevailed more recently. The March 1998 draft dropped mention of merger
clauses from the text altogether.60
If we are going to use "agreement" as the foundation for liability and its
limits in the form contract area, we have to focus on discrete transactions
and ensure that something resembling a true agreement actually takes place
in a reasonable number of transactions. As a matter of transactional process,
this would demand increased interaction between the parties at the point of
agreement, an interaction that would be particularly time-consuming given
the disparity in sophistication and understanding that often accompanies
contracting through a vendor's form. Neither the vendors nor the vendees
are likely to find this a useful expenditure of time and, from the larger per-
spective, such point-of-sale interaction would have a broad, strongly nega-
tive economic impact in the form of increased transaction costs across
millions of transactions. But if real agreement in the mass-produced transac-
tion is, as is likely, impossible (and perhaps undesirable), then on what basis
do we saddle the recipient of the form with whatever happens to be in the
form? And how do we limit the natural tendency of businesses to include in
their forms risk-shifting terms that they know will be unread and therefore
will have little influence on the vendee's decision to buy?
Enforcing the form contract based on hypothesized real agreement per-
mits us to believe or assert that the form recipients will reject the form if
they don't like the boilerplate terms. It allows us to duck the far harder
questions of what regulatory limits ought to be set in place to limit over-
reaching through the form. Perhaps the UCC redrafting process has simply
come to recognize that real agreement is impossible in these cases and,
when confronted with the question "then what?" has simply tossed the im-
document, including evidence of a previous agreement or representation or of a contempora-
neous oral agreement or representation" (revised UCC § 2-202[b], May 1996 draft).
58. This iteration provided as follows: "Except in a consumer contract, a contractual
term indicating that the record completely embodies the agreement of the parties is presumed
to state the intention of the parties on the issue" (revised UCC § 2-202[b][2], November 1996
draft [emphasis added]).
59. This one provided (again, for a nonconsumer) "a contractual term indicating that
the record is a complete and exclusive statement of the agreement of the parties is conclusive
evidence of the intention of the parties" (revised UCC §2-202[b], May 1997 Draft [emphasis
supplied]).
60. Often the result of enforcing a merger clause is to deny effect to a commitment made
prior to the contract by the salesman. One can thus think of merger clauses as disclaiming
"express warranties" that were made by the business's sales force. But unlike disclaimers,
which by their nature may be understandable to form recipients, merger clauses are within the
lawyer's province, and when they operate as disclaimers, it is far less obvious. Yet, in contrast
to the UCC provision regulating disclaimers of implied warranties, there are no statutory
requirements that merger clauses be "conspicuous" or otherwise understandable to the person
reading the form. Compare UCC § 2-316.
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possible reconciliation to the courts. Ultimately, this is a "win" for the form
drafters because our ideology of free contract will persuade nearly all victims
of onerous terms in a form that "it's in the contract and you agreed to it."
This is free-market ideology working at the individiAl !eel with
vengeance.
This free market ideology may explain the staying power of party au-
tonomy and the horse-trade vision in the redrafting effort. If we can tell
ourselves and our citizens that the parties are setting their own terms, mak-
ing up their own minds, or protecting their own interests, our free-market
engine will work optimally. We then don't need governmental regulation.
CLA showcases the limits of such ideas in its materials on unconscio-
nability and the low-income consumer. The basic principle, "unconsciona-
ble contracts will not be enforced," became a firm part of our contract law
through section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code that was com-
pleted in 1958. Ever since, there has been a debate about what it means,
principally on whether the appropriate focus ought to be the process of
making a contract or whether the substance is fair game as well (1 CLA, p.
769). This traditional question is difficult: as hard as it may be for judges
and the litigation system to assess what actually happened between the par-
ties, it is yet more difficult for them to assess whether the exchange was
"fair." CLA includes both an extensive excerpt from a 1968 Federal Trade
Commission study of retailing and credit practices in Washington, D.C. (1
CLA, p. 737), and a study of the low-income retailing practices of Walker
Thomas Furniture (1 CLA, p. 744). Contrary to the assumptions one might
make when reading only appellate opinions in this area, the empirical evi-
dence sketches a decidedly mixed picture of low-income retailing, a picture
that included benefits for the poor that arguably offset some of the more-
well-known harsh practices. Together, the materials confirm the difficulty
of assessing the "fairness" of any exchange, no matter how lopsided it might
seem initially.
The authors' larger agenda is to add to the issues already on the table
an understanding of how large and basic the problems of low-income retail-
ing are, and to reiterate the limits of the case-by-case litigation system in
addressing them. An unconscionability case brought by an individual
against a business is, from the individual's perspective, a fact-intensive, ex-
pensive undertaking with a very uncertain outcome; from the perspective of
the defendant business, it is at most, a small nuisance. An excerpt from a
classic Arthur Leff work on this question hammers the point home (Leff
1969; 1 CLA, p. 768). The very limited solutions to this aspect of the prob-
lem include attempting to get punitive damages for unconscionable conduct
(1 CLA, p. 780), enlisting the help of state attorneys general to carry the
litigation burden (1 CLA, pp. 785, 794), statutory damages, or class actions
(1 CLA, pp. 784-85).
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Much of this evidence has apparently escaped the attention of those
engaged in the UCC redrafting process. At the same time they embrace
bureaucratic certainty and "safe harbors"61 in the form-contract arena, the
drafters seem content to rely on nonbureaucratic, uncertain, and costly "un-
conscionability" to protect those who might otherwise be victimized by the
unscrupulous in business.62 These materials will prompt those evaluating the
"unless it is unconscionable" language of the redrafted UCC 63 to consider
how powerful such an exception can be, when its use depends on an indi-
vidual paying to hire a lawyer to present the fact-intensive case the concept
implies. 64
Finally, the chapter on social control looks at the role of inequality
within our contract and larger economic system. Another excerpt from Ar-
thur Leff (1979; 1 CLA, p. 775) instructs that the difficulty with social
control of contracting comes from our actual embrace of inequality in infor-
mation and bargaining power as the fuel that drives our economic system. It
is attempted advantage taking that makes the free market work. As Leff
says:
Our problem is that we want simultaneously to produce and protect
market efficiency and to achieve non-exploitive market results. But
(given individual differences among people, and innocently achieved
superior information, market power, and pure luck) we cannot have both
at the same time. . . .In effect, we want to have the world so arranged
that everyone will be motivated to get as good a deal for himself as
possible by being as informed and efficient as he can be, but that no
one will have to get a bad deal in the process. But the payoff for the
61. "Safe harbor" is a term those in the drafting process use to connote a clear rule on
which those affected can rely. An example is found in UCC § 2-316(3)(a) providing, in
essence, that the use of "as is" will exclude implied warranties. Drafters can use other words,
but if they use the words "as is," they are reasonably certain to get the legal effect they want.
62. Dean Robert Scott (1994) analyzes the UCC revision process and predicts that
when it has been "captured" by an interest group, bright-line rules will emerge favoring that
group. If there is no clear interest-group dominance, the emerging rule may be "a vague and
nondirective compromise that appears to accomplish something" (1994, 1821). While Scott
was focused on Article 9 of the UCC, the article governing secured credit, interest-group
participation may explain the bright-line rule that emerged at one point for nonconsumers on
parol evidence and the near-complete absence of bright-line rules prohibiting various kinds of
provisions in form contracts more generally.
63. The clause is pervasive in the redraft. Curiously, however, business lawyers have
strenuously resisted the inclusion of an unconscionability provision in UCC Article 1 (the
article stating the general principles that govern all contracting under the UCC) generally on
the ground that it would result in too much uncertainty in contracting. Only half in jest, one
business lawyer went so far as to say it would "invalidate practically every lending contract
under (UCC) Article 9."
64. The long excerpt from an Arthur Leff article (1969; 1 CLA, p. 768) is the most
forceful expression of this point. His basic point is that the litigation model of social control is
far too cumbersome, slow, and expensive to be the least bit effective and that direct regula-
tion, even if politically difficult to achieve, would be far better. Leff even suggests that uncon-
scionability might be worse than no provision at all: "It kind of depends on whether facile
devices like [unconscionabilityl will stall the hard thinking and lobbying that has to be done."
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former necessitates, indeed entails, the latter. Hence, doing both is not
a technical problem-how do you define unconscionability, how do
you specify unfairness in a short statute-but a cultural one: we cannot
have perfect freedom and perfect fairness at once. What we have, in-
stead, ; . ncon a..,ty, a legat device that aliows us, inconsis-
tently and with only symbolic impact, an occasional bow in the
direction of our incoherent hearts desires. (1 CLA, pp. 777-78, em-
phasis in the original)
The connection that CLA's materials suggest between contract law and the
larger political and cultural tensions from which it emerges is one of the
central strengths of the book.
II. CONTINUING RELATIONS "IN ACTION"
In their chapter called "Contract and Continuing Relations," the au-
thors take their readers for a 300-page tour of the world of real-life personal
and business relationships, sometimes referred to as "relational contracts." If
the book as a whole presents a dichotomy between the law on the books
and the law in action through the inclusion of noncase materials, here we
find an emphasis on the dichotomy between theory and reality at a com-
pletely different level. It is here that the authors make the sharpest break
with tradition and raise issues that go to the very core of the subject.
The authors began developing the materials that eventually became
CLA in the early 1970s. One form the project took in that long develop-
ment was as a supplement to relational contract pioneer Ian Macneil's 1971
casebook (Macneil 1977). The influence of Macneil's book is evident in
CLA's early, orienting use of materials on continuing relations to acquaint
students with the complexity of contracting. Macneil's own description of
the relational contract shows how far it is from the horse-trade paradigm
that tends to dominate neoclassical contract law:
The relations are of significant duration (for example, franchising).
Close whole person relations form an integral part of the relation (em-
ployment). The object of exchange typically includes both easily mea-
sured quantities (wages) and quantities not easily measured (the
projection of personality by an airline stewardess). Many individuals
with individual and collective poles of interest are involved in the rela-
tion (industrial relations). Future cooperative behavior is anticipated
(the players and management of the New York Yankees). The benefits
and burdens of the relation are to be shared rather than entirely di-
vided and allocated (a law partnership). The entangling strings of
friendship, reputation, interdependence, morality, and altruistic desires
are integral parts of the relation (a theatrical agent and his clients, a
corporate management team). Trouble is expected as a matter of course
126 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY
(a collective bargaining agreement). Finally, the participants never in-
tend or expect to see the whole future of the relation as presentiated at
any single time, but view the relation as an ongoing integration of
behavior to grow and vary with events in a largely unforeseeable future
(a marriage; a family business). (Macneil 1977, 13)65
In many ways, the CLA authors' focus on the relational contract is a
natural outgrowth of their inclusion of so much noncase law material that
develops the authors' theme that "things are not as they seem." Once we
begin to understand the complexity of familiar family and employment rela-
tionships, we can't help but wonder whether most contracts resemble the
indeterminate, complex, relational contract or its antithesis, the horse-
trade. Like Macneil, the authors locate these materials close to the begin-
ning and thereby suggest that the horse trade is an inappropriate or hope-
lessly narrow paradigm for understanding exchange relationships. Their
inclusion of both franchise and employment materials also exposes students
to subject areas governed by contract law not often encountered in the first-
year offering.
Perhaps the most familiar of interpersonal relationships are those in-
volving loved ones. These nonbusiness relationships beg the question: how
do we fit a marriage or cohabitation "contract" into the horse-trade para-
digm? When, exactly, does such a "deal" come into existence? What, exactly,
are the terms? We all know, of course, that "personal" relationships such as
these gradually develop, have great subtlety, are probably always changing,
and are probably not susceptible to third-party adjudication. How then does
the contract law system, based on the horse-trade paradigm, grapple with
such a problem if confronted with one?
Sometimes the legal system will simply punt. One way to do that is to
conclude that agreements made within a marriage are "outside the realm of
contracts altogether" as did the court in Balfour v. Balfour (1 CLA, p. 251),
a famous case involving a husband's breached promise to send his wife
money each month they were apart. In Miller v. Miller (1 CLA, p. 255), the
parties agreed "to refrain from scolding, fault-finding, and anger"; Mrs.
Miller agreed to "keep her home and family in a comfortable and reasonably
good condition"; and Mr. Miller agreed to pay his wife $200 a year. Mrs.
Miller sued when the money stopped, but the court, refusing to wade into
the "dismal swamp" of judging whether she kept her side of the bargain,
refused relief. An excerpt from a famous article by Zechariah Chafee intro-
duced readers to the "dismal swamp," a situation involving a relationship
that "has its own unique history, specialized vocabulary, power hierarchies,
personal animosities, and implicit understandings," all of which make it
very difficult for an outsider to adequately understand it (Chafee 1930; 1
65. Compare Macneil's description of the horse trade quoted above in note 8.
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CLA, p. 248). Balfour and Miller leave us with the difficult question of
whether a refusal to intervene is a better choice than a judicial dip in the
swamp. Students are forced to recognize this difficult but important ques-
tion, which goes largely unasked by traditional materials.
We find a less wary judicial approach in the book's extensive materials
on the famous California cohabitation case of Marvin v. Marvin. Michelle
Marvin claimed an oral agreement that she and actor Lee Marvin would
pool their efforts and earniiigs and share the fruits of this enterprise. She
then gave up her job as a minor entertainer and moved in with Lee to
perform household and other duties. When Lee put her out, some six years
later, she sued for breach of both express and implied contracts. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of her complaint and sustained
her claims on both express and implied contract bases against Lee. This
"victory" was hardly what it seemed once the authors develop the wider
context: Michelle still had to make her case on the facts.
This proved more difficult, in part because she had to fit her case into
the horse-trade approach that characterizes our law. The oral agreement,
"What I have is yours, and what you have is mine," was, under the circum-
stances, too flimsy to be contractual. "The [trial] judge pointed out that it
was not clear what they were to share over what period" (1 CLA, p. 279)
and that, besides, she had been supported in a nice house with a nice lifes-
tyle and therefore "such services as she has rendered would appear to have
been compensated." The trial court ultimately awarded $104,000 for her
''rehabilitation" but that was reversed on appeal as without legal foundation
(1 CLA, p. 280).
As is typical for these materials, we discover that Lee Marvin regarded
his case as a "cause," that he learned from it "how little truth there is in
court" (1 CLA, p. 281), and that Michelle was living with Dick Van Dyke
in 1986. We are told that Michelle's lawyer, Marvin Mitchelson became
famous, wrote a book, and seems to be "the major beneficiary" of Marvin v.
Marvin (1 CLA, p. 282). Perhaps tongue in cheek, the authors ask us
whether Michelle deserves a share of his profits under the precedent-setting
case of Marvin v. Marvin, on the theory that together she and Mitchelson
engaged in a joint enterprise for law reform and financial gain (1 CLA, p.
282). Marvin is followed by a long excerpt from Hewett v. Hewett (1979), a
case where the Illinois court refused to wade in the same swamp and ex-
plained its decision as enforcing a legislatively determined preference for
legal marriage (1 CLA, p. 284).
The personal relationship materials are followed by sections that show
how similar problems occur in the business context of franchise and employ-
ment contracts. The authors conclude the chapter with a wide range of
materials on long-term commercial relationships, in which, again, similar
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problems are likely to come up. As later materials continue to explore the
subject, relational contracts form the benchmark.
A major lesson that emerges from Marvin and the relational contract
materials more generally is a sense of how difficult it is to fit a relationship
of this kind into our horse-trade model. It seems extremely unlikely that two
persons who move in with one another actually sit down at the outset and
map out even the financial terms of their relationship. More likely, their
relationship would develop gradually, aspects- of it would be difficult to
value, and the anticipation would be that most of it will be worked out as
the parties go along.66 Naturally, this sort of relationship would make it
difficult for a trial court to find something "contractual" in the horse-trade
sense. As suggested by the trial court's decision to award retraining damages,
however, there was some commitment implicit in the relationship. As
shown by the appellate court reversal of that decision, contract law was too
rigid to recognize it.
A. Implications and Extensions of Relational Insights
The chapter on relational contracts shows the rigidity and simplicity of
our neoclassical contract law, and how those characteristics of the law limit
it when dealing with complex problems. This simplicity and rigidity-and
concomitant inadequacy-of the law form a predominant theme that runs
through the materials.
We might think of our contract law as having a peculiarly "binary"
character.67  It takes an "offer," its "acceptance," and "consideration" to
make a contract. Traditional analysis makes the presence of each of these a
yes-or-no proposition. In this simple system, things are black or white with
few half-way measures. The system provides very limited alternatives: either
there is a contract (and we know when it began) or there is not; either there
is a breach or there is not; either there are full contract damages or there is
nothing. Both the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds emphasize
and reinforce this approach by locating, elevating, and enshrining a writing
that, at the outset, is thought to map the entire future for the parties (see
Kuzuhara 1996).
But while businesses might want the certainty and determinacy that
such a simple system suggests, they very often do business in complex ways
that bear little resemblance to the horse trade that this system contem-
plates. As shown throughout CLA's noncase law materials, ambiguity and
66. Macneil (1977, 14) has a very helpful chart showing the differences between his
paradigm relational contract and his paradigm horse trade. He first published a version of the
chart in his famous article, The Many Futures of Contract (1974).
67. Much of our law generally has a binary character (cf. Menkel-Meadow 1991, 7).
Contract law seems to have a good deal more of it than other large areas such as torts.
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compromise, rather than clarity and rigidity, characterize much of business
"in action." The authors offer many examples of attempts to solve complex,
ambiguous problems with our binary tools of contract doctrine. In the pro-
cess, they lay squarely on the table the question "what do we make of a
Joctrinal system that seems so incompetent in dealing with (what may be)
routine business problems?" 68
The legal system's reaction to the disjuncture between the horse trade
and reality is to "cope," 69 and we can see this at the individual case level in
CLA. One reaction of a decision maker to the limits of binary choices is to
create some form of compromise and a rationale to support it. Thus, in our
system, one might view attempted compromises as symptomatic of the inad-
equacy of available choices. The Marvin trial court had to find either that
there was a promise to share everything (which seemed unlikely), or that
there was "no contract" (and find for Lee). Its escape from the binary
straight jacket came via its compromise award of the $104,000 in retraining
expenses for Michelle, expenses that the appellate court found had no sup-
port at law (1 CLA, p. 280). The Peevyhouse jury did much the same thing
when it awarded the Peevyhouses $5,000 (1 CLA, p. 199), an amount be-
tween the binary alternatives of $29,000 to actually fill in the strip pit and
the $300 difference in land value the strip pit represented.
We find the same coping phenomenon writ large in promissory estop-
pel, the contract doctrine that awards a plaintiff a recovery if she reasonably
relied to her detriment on what the promisor said. The twentieth-century
growth of promissory estoppel's focus on the promisee's reliance interest,
rather than the promisor's voluntary commitment, was a central focus in
Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract. It set up his thesis that "contract,"
based on "promise" was being gobbled up by "reliance," based on tortlike
notions of redressing harm inflicted by others.
Reliance is one solution to contract law's rigid approach to contract
formation. While this rigidity has been softened a little for sales-of-goods
cases under the UCC,70 traditional contract law envisions a "moment"
when a contract pops into existence. In binary fashion, before that moment,
there is nothing. After it, there are full expectation damages. This binary
approach, in turn, begets an entire legal category of "pre-contractual liabil-
ity" based on a multitude of theories.
68. The book deals with employment relations, but it does less than it could with collec-
tive-bargaining agreements. Although separating the contractual issues from the complexities
of labor law might be a neat trick for a first-year contracts text, such contracts are quintessen-
tially relational in character. See note 53, supra.
69. Perhaps Arthur Leff should be credited with the idea that common law courts simply
"cope": "Remember, the idea [in policing bad retailing conduct] is to change as many nasty
forms and practices as possible, not merely to add to the glorious common law tradition of
eventually coping" (Leff 1969, 357; 1 CLA, p. 774).
70. UCC § 2-204(2) provides, for example, that a sales agreement can be found "even
though the moment of its making is undetermined."
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Although a ceremonial "closing" may occur, many (most?) real-life
business relationships probably develop gradually as mutual commitment
deepens. When those developing relations are severed during this gradual
process, but before the "moment," the law sometimes looks to reliance for a
midway solution. We find that happening in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc
(1 CLA, p. 403). In awarding a reliance recovery for what amounted to
defendant's precontract harmful negotiating misconduct, the court candidly
stated that it "would be a mistake to regard an action grounded on promis-
sory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach-of-contract action" (1 CLA, p.
409). In its fluidity with damages and doctrine, Hoffman is more tort-like
than it is contractual.
Pennzoil v. Texaco (2 CLA, p. 175) deals with the same problem but,
ironically, Pennzoil, a tort case, seems more contractual. There, Getty pulled
out of an alleged agreement to sell its assets to Pennzoil and sold them to
Texaco instead. Getty did this before the Pennzoil-Getty deal formally
closed but after the parties had uncorked champagne and reported the deal
to the newspapers (2 CLA, p. 176). Pennzoil's response was a tort suit
against Texaco for interference with its "contract." Applicable doctrine re-
quired "a contract" before there could be an interference case. In binary
fashion, then, liability depended on whether the Pennzoil-Getty contract
had formed before Getty broke off the relationship: if it had formed, Texaco
was liable for full tort damages, measured in part, by the value of Getty's
promise. If the contract had not formed, Texaco was liable for nothing. The
question of contract formation, a predicate to the interference claim, went
to a Texas jury that returned a $10.53 billion verdict, the largest civil judg-
ment at that point in our history 7i The possibilities that the contract and
commitments represented by the contract formed gradually, or that the
harm inflicted on Pennzoil might have been less than the value of the deal,
were foreclosed by contract doctrine working within this tort. We have no
concept of "half-contract" nor do we think of contract loss as other than
"what was promised."
Tort law, always considerably more fluid and flexible than contract
law, took a similar binary approach with contributory negligence, the doc-
trine that barred 100% of a plaintiff's negligence claim against a defendant
if the plaintiff were found to be negligent at all (see generally Keeton 1984,
§ 65).72 Many legislatures have largely changed this to comparative negli-
gence by statute (Keeton 1984, § 67) and have thereby both recognized that
responsibility for an accident may be shared, and implied that courts and
juries are capable of deciding complex nonblack and white questions.
71. 1 discuss the tort of interference with contract and the individualistic critiques mar-
shaled to condemn it in Woodward 1996.
72. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the idea of contributory negligence is thought to
spring from the same "individualistic attitude of the common law" (Keeton 1971, 452) as
underlies classical contract.
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Nothing of comparable scope has developed in the contract system,
and we find the difficulties that our simple yes-or-no approach gives us in
case after case. Bethlehem Steel v. Litton Industries (2 CLA, p. 101) raised the
question of whether Bethlehem had exercised an option it had purportedly
received via a two-page letter prepared on the spot during the closing of a
related contract. If it had, damages were $95 million; if it had not, it would
receive zero. There were no other doctrinal possibilities. We learn from
noncase materials that 11 appellate judges ultimately considered the case
and that they split 6 to 5 in favor of the trial court's judgment of zero.
Toward the end of the book, we find judges in very large cases cutting the
baby in half rather than choosing one of two bad options.7 3
As Gilmore made so clear with his promissory estoppel example, as
courts wrestle with unsavory binary choices, modern neoclassical contract
doctrine itself develops ways to mediate. "Material breach" is one of the
oldest mediating doctrines. Since at least the eighteenth century (Kingston
v. Preston [1773]), contract performances have been interrelated and depen-
dent or "conditional" on one another. Given the interrelationship, logic
would seem to dictate that if one side doesn't get what was promised, it need
not deliver what it promised either. The drafter can make explicit in a con-
tract that her side's entire performance is conditional on receipt of every
single thing promised by the other side. Then, if the other side deviates
even slightly, the condition would, logically, excuse the drafter from all
performance. 74
The situation will, of course, come up where one side has expended
resources in reliance on the contract yet committed only a tiny breach, and
it is evident that the other side will enjoy a windfall if freed from its own
reciprocal obligation to perform. The "logical" choices are to find for the
breacher by denying that the breach exists at all, or to find for the non-
breacher and award her an unearned windfall. The Hobson's choice of full-
expectation-damages liability or no liability begs for a solution.
73. Volume 2, chapter 6 contains cases and related situations arising under modem doc-
trines of mistake, frustration of purpose, and commercial impracticability. The chapter both
develops those doctrinal areas and reinforces the theme that contract doctrine is far too sim-
ple and offers far too few-and too rigid-options to offer much rational help in cases like
this.
74. It should come as no surprise that landlord-tenant law was historically to the con-
trary: the tenant could not refuse to pay rent on account of the landlord's material breach of
his obligations to maintain the premises (Casner 1952, 1:§ 3.11). The covenants were said to
be "independent" of one another so that the breach of one had nothing to do with the obliga-
tions to perform the other. This has largely been abrogated by statute or common law deci-
sion. In Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper (1969), for example, the defendant abandoned the
premises over two years before the expiration of the lease because of constant flooding that
wasn't remedied. When the landlord sued for the rent, the court found that the defendant was
entitled to a covenant of quiet enjoyment and that the landlord's failure to remedy the situa-
tion amounted to a constructive eviction.
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Since at least the early twentieth century, modem contract law has
mitigated the harshness of conditional performances by limiting one's "exit"
from the contract to situations in which the other side has "materially"
breached. Absent a "material breach," the injured party cannot withdraw
from the contract and withhold her remaining performance. Rather, she
must fully perform and will receive in exchange the other side's performance
(diminished by the immaterial breach) plus contract damages to make up
the difference.7 5 While partial performance plus damages is different from
"what the nonbreacher bargained for," the solution breaks the binary logic
of conditions and injects flexibility and, arguably, fairness into the liability
decision. 6
But there are detractors from even this limited doctrinal concession to
flexibility. The problem is that "material breach" is fact laden and indeter-
minate-a "dismal swamp." If one exits in response to an "immaterial
breach," the exit itself becomes a "material breach" and subjects the depart-
ing party to full liability for breach of contract. The businessperson cannot
know for sure when she can simply withhold performance and walk away
without liability, and the business lawyer cannot give clear advice that will
help with that binary decision. What is worse, a'decision about how to
respond to the other side's breach must be made quickly, and a failure to
exit in response to a material breach could suggest either a waiver of rights
or a modification of the underlying agreement.
The indeterminancy problems become even more acute once the law
recognizes that one can "repudiate" a contract before one's performance is
due. Now courts can be confronted with the question of whether talk
amounted to a material repudiation that excused the other side from walk-
ing away from its commitments. 7 In the worst of cases, continuing one's
performance following the other side's repudiation subjects one to the
charge that her damages were self-inflicted and, hence, not recoverable.7 8
75. "Substantial performance" and "material breach" express the same idea. The former
grew up in cases involving construction contracts and was perhaps best articulated by Judge
Benjamin Cardozo in Jacob and Youngs v. Kent (1921; 2 CLA, p. 441). We find "material
breach" most often in cases not involving building contracts.
76. CLA's authors show repeatedly and pervasively that courts achieve flexibility in
many situations by going entirely out of the contract system into the restitution system, a
body of law that will require one side or the other to return benefits if they are characterized
as "unjust enrichment." If restitution were unavailable to insert flexibility, we would no doubt
have a very different looking contract system. We can say the same of other related liability
systems. The coexistence of the bankruptcy system alongside the contracts system, for exam-
ple, permits the latter to maintain the image and doctrine of absolute liability-a deal is a
deal-while providing flexibility and relief (through bankruptcy) in situations that require it
(see Warren 1987).
77. A good example is Bill's Coal Co., Inc. v. Board of Public Utilities of Springfield, Mo.
(1982; 2 CLA, p. 565).
78. In Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge (1929), a contractor continued building a
bridge after the county voted to terminate the contract, and was ultimately barred from recov-
ering damages following the county's repudiation. The contractor's decision about what to do
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The tension between the "dismal swamp" of real-life facts, and the ri-
gidity-but apparent predictability-of our binary contract system is physi-
cally replicated in Article 2 of the UCC. In a nod to simple answers and
apparent certainty and predictability, it showcases a simple "perfect tender"
rule in its first remedial section, section 2-601, by proclaiming (in essence)
that any breach in a seller's delivery can justify the buyer's walking away
from the deal (rejection). Then, to the frustration of thousands of law stu-
dents, it quietly bows to fairness and reason when it undercuts the simple
rule elsewhere with complicated swamp rules that will keep the buyer in the
contract despite the seller's breach (e.g., UCC §§ 2-508, 2-608, 2-612). 79
We would like relatively objective certainty and fair and reasonable
decisions in all cases. As both Gilmore and Leff so forcefully suggested, we
can't have both. The tension created from these conflicting desires eventu-
ally produces modem doctrines such as promissory estoppel and material
breach, and is similar and related to that created by our conflicting demands
for certainty and free choice, discussed above. These and other irresolvable
conflicts in what we want from contract law may partially account first for
the initial simplicity and rigidity of the dominant horse-trade paradigm
(when "certainty" had the upper hand) and, later, for the increasing com-
plexity in neoclassical contract law, as "real agreement" took hold and miti-
gating and mediating doctrines were piled onto the horse-trade model.
While CLA makes a near-overwhelming case that contemporary con-
tract doctrine, still based on the horse-trade model, is ill-suited to the reali-
ties of relational contracting, it doesn't clearly point the reader in the
direction of more discretionary and flexible contract rules. From the Parker
case at the very beginning, many of its cases and readings suggest that the
adjudication system is part of the problem and that courts' access to fully
textured facts via the litigation system is likely to be distorted and inade-
quate.80 This leaves a very uneasy feeling about both the structure and the
capabilities of the current system. True to the casebook genre, the authors
present readers with the problem and the available tools but offer us little
advice about what we should do next.
following the repudiation was difficult because the county was engaged in a political struggle
and the decision to repudiate, although ultimately found valid, had questionable legal author-
ity at the time the county communicated it to the contractor. Had the contractor left the job
following an invalid county decision, the contractor would have been liable to the county for
damages for breach of contract.
79. CLA underscores the resulting complexity and shows how courts add to it by
manipulating the notion of "acceptance" to produce results they regard as fair. (2 CLA, pp.
459-70).
80. This theme is emphasized in the CLA's chapter on social control (e.g., pp. 539-41)
and is given final force by showing courts struggling to reach fair results in impenetrably
complex commercial impracticability cases. An example of the latter is the British Parlia-
ment's legislative loss-splitting solution to a general contracts problem and Judge Gofs diffi-
culties with it in B. P. Exploration Co. v. Hunt (1979), explored through text notes (2 CLA,
p. 647).
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III. THE FUTURE
Stewart Macaulay began his empirical investigations into contracts in
the late 1950s. Ian Macneil first advanced the relational contract idea in
the 19 60s. Since that time, law students of the University of Wisconsin
have used CLA's predecessor materials. A good deal of scholarship has de-
veloped relational contract ideas, and there has been an increase in the
incidence of empirical research in the literature. Nonetheless, it is fair to say
that we continue to be bound to the same general paradigm and ideas about
contracts. Indeed, parts of the contemporary scene might even suggest that
our thinking has been moving in the opposite direction, back to our earlier,
simpler ideas of contracting, amplified by a new confidence in
individualism.
The horse-trade paradigm based on the hypothesis of individual free-
dom and self-interest has great power in contemporary politics and law re-
form. Despite incessant criticism of their oversimplified model, many law
and economics scholars continue to offer normative recommendations pred-
icated on the fully informed individual being offered legal incentives to do
this or that. "Party autonomy" has become a mantra in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code reform process. Under that banner march proposals to permit
parties to choose any law they please to govern (and regulate) their con-
tract, s' and to agree to litigate their cases in any jurisdiction they please
(e.g, UCC § 2B-108 [April 1998 draft]). 82 The Supreme Court's incredible
assumptions about consumer contracting in Carnival Cruise Lines, men-
tioned earlier, and its decisions and those of lower courts tending to sustain
arbitration in form-contract settings, are further evidence that the old para-
digm and assumptions are alive and well. One could interpret all this as a
signal of a broader return to the Willistonian idea of simple doctrine and
81. The idea appeared in the drafts of UCC § 1-302 (September 1997 draft) and art. 2B-
107 (April 1998 draft). Both make it clear that the intent is that the parties can select even
"mandatory law" (law that one is, under usual circumstances, stuck with) despite their having
no connection with it. The art. 2B draft clearly contemplates "agreement" taking place via
vendor-drafted form contracts. Consumers have been included in some versions, excluded in
others. The consumer provision in draft art. 2B reads as follows: "The parties in their agree-
ment may choose the applicable law. However, in a consumer transaction, the choice is not
enforceable to the extent it varies a consumer protection rule that which cannot be varied by
agreement under the law of the jurisdiction whose law would apply in the absence of the
agreement" (UCC § 2B-107[a], April 1998 draft). Presumably, an enacting legislature will be
giving software vendors and others governed by art. 2B the extraordinary power to choose
their way out of otherwise-applicable state law rules that cannot be varied by agreement
(maximum interest rates, limitations on self-help, plain language rules, etc., etc.) in noncon-
sumer transactions. The extraterritorial effect of one state's enactment of this rule could be
absolutely stunning.
82. Here again the intent is to permit "agreement" to be found on vendor-drafted forms.
The provision currently provides only that the "parties in their agreement may choose an
exclusive judicial forum unless the choice is unreasonable and unjust." Presumably, it will be
up to the consumer or small business sued in the "chosen" distant forum to establish before
that court that the choice was "unreasonable and unjust."
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simple, yet unresponsive, answers to multitextured, subtle problems. Might
this be an "unlikely resurrection" of classical contract Gilmore hinted at?
(1974, 103; Mooney 1995, 1207). If it is, the odds seem good that it will be
short-lived.
Several developments come to mind that have laid groundwork for ba-
sic, fundamental change from the rigid way we have thought about contract
law to something far more flexible, nuanced, and responsive to the way
business and other relationships seem to work.
First, we might expect courts to continue developing an expanded view
of their own capabilities in adjudicating disputes. During the past 20 years,
comparative negligence has become a fundamental part of the torts system,
replacing the binary contributory-negligence regime that preceded it. This
system permits liability decisions at many more points than the more primi-
tive liability/no-liability system, and lawyers, judges, and scholars have
grown comfortable with this more modem system. Similarly, since Brown v.
Board of Education (1955), courts have made much greater use of injunc-
tions to address a broad range of social problems. This is another develop-
ment from outside the contracts system that calls for half-way, gradual
measures and tailors the relief to the underlying facts. To the extent that
the contracts system's binary character stems from the wider legal system's
own binary characteristics, we can expect those core attributes of the con-
tracts system to be softened as confidence and facility with less polar deci-
sion making and predicting develops. s 3
This development may be a mixed blessing. As CLA's materials sug-
gest, the litigation system is notoriously ineffective in presenting courts
with all they need to know in order to formulate sound, responsive deci-
sions, even simple binary ones. If courts recognize more decisional options,
they could make more mistakes. But it is the complexity and nuance of the
facts that are the problem, and that complexity will not change with a more
flexible range of decisions. Indeed, with a larger range of available decisions,
the inevitable resulting judicial errors might well be smaller and distributed
more broadly across litigants. 84
More flexibility with outcome may, in turn, lead to more negotiation
and compromise of disputes that formerly would have gone to trial for an
all-or-nothing decision. This too may not be all positive. While consensual
dispute resolution is commonly thought superior to court-imposed solutions
83. In a speech at the 1997 annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, Judge (and former Dean) Guido Calabrisi identified comparative negligence and the
move in tort law away from yes-or-no decision making as a singular development that would
have profound effects on the law.
84. Needless to say, the litigation system will always be plagued by the differences in
resources and access of those who come before it. Whether those differences will be magnified
or mitigated in a more flexible system is a matter of speculation.
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for a variety of reasons,85 negotiations between those of disparate power can
reproduce the power imbalance in the negotiated outcome.86
Second, in the past 10 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the
use of contractual, court-ordered, and voluntary mediation to resolve dis-
putes that otherwise might go to adjudication (Holden 1997). The reasons
for this increase are varied. Court backlogs surely account for some of the
increase.87 Yet if court backlogs have fueled the development, the result has
been the rise of a very broad, general acceptance of this form of alternative
dispute resolution. For our purposes, the parties to a mediation must cooper-
ate for the process to succeed, and it is not the zero-sum game that litigation
often is. Successful mediation requires that each side understand the other's
point of view and develop creativity in accommodating it. Increased expo-
sure of lawyers to mediation will eventually prompt lawyers to think differ-
ently and more creatively about disputes. As mediation becomes more
pervasive, we might expect parties and their lawyers to begin thinking dif-
ferently about their relationships before they encounter disputes and to de-
sign their relationships to include mechanisms to permit them to have the
flexibility and growth that relational contract ideas contemplate. 88 This will
further untie lawyers from their traditional way of thinking about
contracts.
8 9
Mediation, too, is a two-edged sword, however, because mediation can
reproduce the power imbalances of those who participate in it.90 Courts can
85. Menkel-Meadow refers to both efficiency and quality-of-justice reasons commonly
advanced to support claims settlement (1991, 6).
86. The point has been made repeatedly in the alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
literature. A lawyer who had experience contracting in Japan brought this home to me in a
conversation several years ago. He confirmed my impression that Japanese law is far more
"relational" than is American contract law, preferring to begin a relationship with trust and
work things out as issues arise during the relationship (Cf. Kuzuhara 1996). This essentially
relational approach had always seemed preferable to the American horse trade, at least for
long-term, complex relationships. But this lawyer reminded me of what is now the obvious: in
the inevitable negotiations that follow the broad relational outline, the stronger party always
tends to "win." In the American system, if one gets lucky and strikes a deal that does not
reflect the preexisting power structure, one at least has a chance of breaking out of that power
structure. The Japanese system seems more likely than ours to perpetuate power imbalances.
87. The promise of caseload reduction for large corporations may well have propelled
ADR into the mainstream (Cf. Menkel-Meadow 1991, 8-9). Yet surely some of the increase is
attributable to the attention scholars have given mediation as a more relational, humane
approach to solving problems.
88. Thomas Palay (1986) describes these sorts of mechanisms.
89. Whether connected to the rise in mediation or not, the massive influx of women
into the legal profession in the past 30 years will continue to push contract law in a relational
direction. Although there is some evidence that the law school experience has a corrosive
influence on women (Janoff 1991), it seems likely that most will emerge from the experience
with some of their relational instincts intact. The more recent entry of women lawyers into
business law areas should increase the rate of change in the way we approach contracting and
contract disputes. In 1998, 10,060 women (about 20%) were in the 49,070 member Section of
Business Law of the American Bar Association.
90. The point has been made by many including Martha Fineman (1988) and the late
Trina Grillo (1991). Authorities are gathered and summarized in Menkel-Meadow 1991, 11.
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compensate for perceived power differences in their decisions, and the law
often contains power balancing doctrines. In voluntary mediation, 91
mediators make no decisions through which they might compensate for im-
balance, and the law does not even purport to control the outcome.
Third, we might expect the internationalization of business to influ-
ence our individualistic, horse-trade, contract-law paradigm and the binary
thinking that comes with it. CLA suggests that European Civil Law may
have more flexibility than ours with both mistake and precontractual liabil-
ity. In preferring specific performance to damages, and enforcing penalty
clauses, civil law is far more willing to keep a relationship together than it is
to permit one side to calculate the other's damages and walk away if it is
profitable. Americans, accustomed to "light[ing] out for the territory" to
escape undesirable relationships (Twain 1884, 281), will no doubt press for
their individualistic law in the international marketplace but may wind up
paying a price for it. As we become more comfortable with the less individu-
alistic law of others, we may be less tenacious in holding on to our own old
ways.
Finally, and most obviously, the dramatic increase in scholarship that
goes outside the law library for information to help us better understand the
law "in action" is bound to press us in new directions. It scarcely needs
saying that evolving business practice offers near infinite opportunities for
scholarly study and analysis. But while scholars recognized "commercial
practice" in the 1930s and made it a cornerstone of the UCC, legal scholars
did not systematically begin to look at how businesses actually used law
until Stewart Macaulay began his work in the 1950s.
Macaulay's kind of work has made steady progress in finding its way
into law schools. Thirty years ago, a law professor conducting empirical or
sociological research into the law was taking substantial academic risks and
20 years ago the situation was not much different. Today, by contrast, one
can find law professors publishing empirical studies of business contracting
in the Harvard Law Review (e.g., Mann, 1996). The recent rise in this kind
of scholarship within the law schools has been dramatic and we can proba-
bly expect this trend of expansion in scholarship about commercial law to
continue. As more law faculty members move to conduct their own empiri-
cal work, they will more naturally embrace others' work coming from
outside the law schools. 92
For the law of contracts, their insights suggest that mediation has its best chances of real
success where it is not mandatory and where the participants have relatively even bargaining
power.
91. Mandatory mediation programs have sometimes included the filing of a report by the
mediator with the court. This form of mediation can actually exacerbate the problems of
power imbalance (Grillo 1991).
92. In his president's message for August 1997, Association of American Law Schools
President John Sexton lists "to connect law studies more coherently with the studies of the
other human sciences" as first on the agenda of "unfinished business" for law schools.
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CLA and books like it will play an important role in the likely transfor-
mation of contract law from its individualist character to something differ-
ent. With pressure from the Bar to better prepare students for actual law
practice, we can expect more of this "nontraditional" material to work its
way into law school classrooms and affect, in fundamental ways, the think-
ing of a new generation of lawyers, judges, and scholars.
Two classes of my students who used this book have now graduated
from law school. During their second and third years, I taught enough of
them to conclude that they thought about contracts differently than did
their more traditionally educated peers. With this book, law students began
their thinking about the subject on a completely different set of premises.
The consequences of their very different education is likely to be the book's
most important legacy. In the shorter run, students' orientation to how the
law will actually affect the lives and businesses of their clients will immedi-
ately make them more responsive to client needs.
But what is more significant is that these students have never been
intellectually confined by the individualist, predominantly binary features
of modem contract law. True, the authors themselves don't replace Gil-
more's "dead" contract law with something different or better.93 But the
very process of putting the torch to Gilmore's grand contract law may have
cleared an area for scholars with less inhibited imaginations to sow and cul-
tivate something different and more useful. I'm hopeful that the different
intellectual orientation of the teachers and students who use this book will
empower some of us, finally, to develop a contract law that is better suited
to the complex world in which it will operate.
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